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# The Structure of Relevance and Marxian Sociology of Knowledge: An Analysis of Hegemony and Voluntary Associations

Larry R. Irons

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THE STRUCTURE OF RELEVANCE AND  
MARXIAN SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE:  
AN ANALYSIS OF HEGEMONY AND  
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of Sociology

Western Kentucky University

Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Larry R. Irons

December 1977

THE STRUCTURE OF RELEVANCE AND  
MARXIAN SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE:  
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VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

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## PREFACE

In recent years the sociology of deviance has undergone a major shift in emphasis. Early investigations into the relation of social processes to the phenomena of deviance were couched in a perspective focusing on the individual qualities of the deviant actor. A relatively new orientation has emerged, however, which concentrates the analysis of deviance in processes of reality construction as they relate to political authority. Socio-political definitions of deviance do not reflect deviants' relationships to political authority based upon their acceptance of a generalized consensus. Rather, social deviance has acquired the status of a phenomena within that sphere of social discourse through which varying forms of consciousness are granted legitimation. The emergence of deviance as a quasi-legitimate form of social existence herein is held to underly the socio-political transformation of stigma and the reconstitution of commitment to a resultant mediational identity.

This thesis proffers a unique theoretical approach to the study of deviance. It is one in which phenomenological commitment and social action are held to result from a form of collective legitimation through identity transformation. The process of identity transformation subsequently leads to a positive, essential status for a form of collective-identity. Drawing heavily upon the work of Alfred Schutz, structures of relevance are specified for collective-identities in the publications of voluntary associations of homosexuals. These publications function as a referent for hegemonic meanings which reflect the collective-self of these associations of deviants.



These collective-selves represent symbolic communities which may be structurally analyzed through a specification of phenomenological commitment and its accompanying relevance structures. To accomplish this theoretical endeavor, this thesis employs a Marxian sociology of knowledge. The appropriate methodological apparatus relies on phenomenological commitment for the specification of community-consciousness as it relates to forms of "phantasied" social praxis.

This work also provides a critique of deterministic Marxism as well as an investigation of social knowledge from the perspective of Karl Mannheim. It is shown that these orientations both represent modes of thought which cannot approach the phenomena of ideology in a reflexive manner. This critique is based on an interpretation of the theoretical orientation of Antonio Gramsci as presented in his Selections From the Prison Notebooks (1972). Subsequently, ideological modalities are specified through an interpretation of the Marxian nature of the individual's relation to the community of deviants. Emphasis is placed upon the intersubjective nature of association and the ideological modalities which may be identified within categories of reified or processural legitimation.

Following its development, this theoretical orientation is used as an approach to a specific identificational structure of deviance--homosexuality. The homosexual community is shown to retain certain structural features which function to dereify identity while maintaining an internal hegemonic structure. Thus, deviance may occur among homosexuals as well as between the homosexual and heterosexual symbolic orders. The differences among the various strata of the homosexual community are specified through an examination of phenomenological relevance structures

of the associational collective-self. This approach involves an intuitive analysis of various themes of relevancy within the publications of voluntary associations representing the symbolic order of homosexuality.

Literature obtained from 21 voluntary associations is examined as the "data" of this inquiry. The methodological apparatus for the analysis of this literature is based on two components of each respective substructure of legitimation--its Marxian nature and its phenomenological commitment to social change. The Marxian nature of each association is identified through the projected relationship of the individual deviant to the legitimizing community. Reified and processural types of relations between the individual and the community are specified through analysis of statements in the literature of these voluntary associations. The phenomenological commitment to social change is identified through various ideological modalities which reflect identifiable commitments to social change. A referent typology is constructed from these two theoretical components (Marxian nature and phenomenological commitment) which serves as an ideological map of the structure of legitimation within the homosexual community. In order to extend the analysis herein developed, ethnomethodological research is considered desirable since the emergent base of these communities cannot be adequately scrutinized from the thematic data examined in this thesis. The ideological character of homosexual communities must be placed in a contextual nexus so that the activity of intersubjective negotiation within phenomenological commitment is made central to further analysis.

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113 pages

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This thesis examines the hegemonic function of symbolic structures of relevance as they are related to phenomenological commitments to social change held by voluntary associations of homosexuals. The data base of this investigation consists of the literature of 21 homophile organizations.

Organizational literature is used to facilitate a theoretical adaptation of Alfred Schutz' discussion of relevance structures which addresses the hegemonic organization of voluntary associations. The concept of relevance structure was implemented to relate predominant orientations within the sociology of deviance to a phenomenological interpretation of group commitment to social change. The specification of various levels of phenomenological commitment serves as a heuristic device for scrutinizing the instrumental as well as expressive functions fulfilled by relevance structures. These hegemonic components sustain a "phantasied praxis" within a particularistic world-view. This conception of social praxis was drawn from Antonio Gramsci's interpretation of a Marxian sociology of knowledge. Subsequently, the relevance structures of each association are juxtaposed to its level of phenomenological commitment as well as its Marxian nature. This operation culminated in the construction of a referent typology which outlines "families" of relevance structure in relation to orientations to phantasied praxis.

CHAPTER I

QUALITATIVE SOCIAL PRAXIS:  
THE DEREIFICATION OF STIGMA

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the delineation of selected portions of a body of knowledge conventionally identified as the study of social deviance with specific emphasis upon the various theoretical assumptions embodied in the "societal reaction" perspective. An explanation for the social-psychological change or transformation of "identity" which stigmatized individuals may undergo is examined theoretically. This transformation is shown to be most adequately explained through an investigation of the complementarity of the assumptions embodied in the labeling and phenomenological orientations to the study of social deviance.

The labeling orientation gives an adequate emphasis to deviance amplifying processes as institutionally derived through the imputation of "alienated power" which is realized within stigmatizing definitions. The phenomenological perspective lends theoretical explanations for the existence of "secret deviance" and also adds credibility to the concept of secondary deviation perceived as the "consciousness" of and belief in a "we-union." The penumbral area of belief links the two orientations to subuniverses of meaning at the theoretical level.

### Deviance and Labeling

Attempts to explain social behavior through the formulation of sociological theory may be grouped around two conceptually polar points of view. On one hand society is viewed "as a network of human activity" (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 196), while on the other extreme it "presents us with society conceived as a thing-like facticity, standing over and against its individual members with coercive controls and molding them in the socializing processes" (Berger and Pullberg, 1965: 196). These seemingly contradictory views are inadequate to explain behavioral relationships when each is considered independently. However, if viewed as complementary opposites embodying the producer (man) and the product (society) in an ever-moving dialectic, a comprehensive understanding of social life is practicable. Indeed, Berger and Pullberg state:

If we understand this process as involving both subjective productivity and objective product, men producing society and in turn being produced by it, then our theorizing will be propelled towards formulations of this dialectic in its totality. Indeed it will become necessary to understand society as a dialectical process (1965: 197).

The sociology of deviance has undergone major changes in its assumptions concerning the nature of deviant behavior in recent years. These new conceptions have been incorporated into a perspective which emphasized the relationship between deviance and the resulting stigma as products of dynamic interactional situations and not pre-ordained characteristics of the individual. A major premise of this orientation holds that deviance is the result of a definitional statement of "undesirability" facilitated by an imputational relation with a significant other embodying some form of coercive power in relationship to the individual. That



is, deviance represents a product of "alienated power." This orientation has become popularly known as labeling theory.

Those theoretical orientations previously posited within the study of deviance have tended to concentrate on the "pathological" qualities of the individual or on those of his environment. These pathologies were considered to be the etiological source of deviant behavior patterns. The concept of environmental pathology inferred the status of an organic totality to society that was couched in terms of health (functional) or illness (dysfunctional). To view society as a consensual totality enabled the concept of pathology to survive existentialist doubts regarding biological determinism and allowed pathology to be couched in terms of personal states-of-being as "healthy" or "ill" (Matza, 1969: 41-43).<sup>1</sup> C. Wright Mills in his now classic work, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists" (1943), demonstrates that the sociological concept of social pathology reflects a belief in the homogenous character of social norms and fails to explain "deviations from norms in terms of the norms themselves." Mills states that "if the 'norms' were examined, the investigator would perhaps be carried to see total structures of norms and to relate these to distributions of power" (Mills, 1963: 534).

Labeling theorists generally accepted Mills' conceptualization and attempted to demonstrate that deviance is not a characteristic of acts which infringe upon consensual norms, but instead it is a product of human definitions based on varying positions of power in impositional situations of interaction. Those scholars subscribing to the labeling perspective, however, contend that deviance does not exist until an individual is formally identified. They argue the act of labeling by

moral entrepreneurs represents the cause of deviant phenomena (Becker, 1974: 42). While the misery and social difficulties associated with the designation of the individual as a deviant cannot be denied, the public designation of an individual as deviant is not a necessary condition for the existence of a perceived state of deviation by the individual.<sup>2</sup> This is an inherent characteristic of Becker's original definition of deviance which was couched in what has become known as the interactionist perspective.

Becker (1963) argues that deviance is not a quality of an act, but is a result of the application of rules which sanction behavior. Within the context of this notion is the implicit assumption that a deviant act can be detected by the investigator without the aid of the perception and subsequent labeling of the act as deviant by members of the community (Katz, 1972: 189). Becker develops a typology of deviant behavior in which the parameters establish "obedient behavior as opposed to rule-breaking behavior" and present the possibilities of an individual who is either (1) falsely accused; (2) a pure deviant; (3) conforming; or (4) a secret deviant (1963: 20). This typology implies that the categories of "secret deviance" and the "falsely accused" are detectable apart from the labeling since classificatory rules exist independent of the labeling process (Katz, 1972: 189). Such a typology, then, posits the existence of two categories of individuals. The first includes those individuals who have engaged in acts which may be designated as deviant, but who for some reason escaped labeling. The second category involves those individuals who have been "officially" labeled and also includes persons, who, while treated as a deviant, never committed the deviant act (see Becker, 1974;

Kitsuse and Cicourel, 1963; and Sudnow, 1967). Secret deviance is an inherent characteristic of the first category, whereas the falsely accused individual and the pure or secondary deviant are located in the second category.

Apart from a concern for the source of stigma in behavioral definitions of deviance, the interactionist perspective has emphasized the process of deviant identification. This process proceeds from a state of being in which deviant acts are considered a part of the individual's identity (primary deviation) to a state of being which confers a status of "secondary deviation" in which the deviant identity is the centralizing fact in the individual's life, guiding and conforming his behavior to the expectations attendant to that identity (Lemert, 1951; 1967: 63). Of central importance to the facilitation of this process is the existence of denunciation ceremonies which are products of categorical definitions positing the status of deviance to a particular act (see Lofland, 1969, and Garfinkel, 1956). These ceremonies present a unified moral conception of the actor as a deviant (Lofland, 1969: 156) and symbolize "the public affirmation of social ideals and norms" (Gusfield, 1967: 176) which "impose a structure of meaning upon the social world by creating one of the most significant and coherent identities that men can impute to their fellows" (Carson, 1974: 79). This "absolute" moral statement represents a symbolic instance of "fetichized morality" through which humanly created rules may be construed as ontological entities. The internalization of this impositional statement, however, is a result of intersubjective identification.

The centrality of the denunciation ceremony to the self-identification as deviant, then, does not account for instances of self-labeling which as Katz



(1972: 187-188) has indicated, may reflect an actual breach of rules or may be a self-imposed label produced by intuitive mechanisms. Becker (1974: 47-48) attempts to clarify the problem posed by this category of deviance by suggesting that it objectifies a state-of-being in which the actor perceives himself to be vulnerable to the imputation of a deviant identification by Others. Hawkins and Tiedemann(1975) have identified two possible effects of deviant self-identification-- objective and subjective effects. Objective effects exist as a result of institutional actions which serve to stigmatize the accused individual on the level of existence. Subjective effects are referred to by Hawkins and Tiedemann as "the way in which deviant thinks about himself and his situation," and "the way he now interprets the social world around him from the vantage point of his new status" (1975: 242). Objective effects and subjective effects as utilized in the labeling orientation are considered necessary components of "secondary deviation," but if viewed as independent motivations for perceptions of deviance by individuals, several possibilities exist. These "possibilities" are well represented in the following diagram taken from Hawkins and Tiedemann(1975: 242):

<u>Rule Violation Occurs and Is Known</u>		
<u>Objective Effects</u>		
<u>Subjective Effects</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Absent</u>
	<u>Present</u> complete labeling	imagine labeling
	<u>Absent</u> naive optimism	neutralized deviance

The designated procedures for discovering deviance, then, are not contingent upon the social identification of the individual as a deviant. For instance, observers may determine whether an act of theft has occurred and may



impute the responsibility for this act to an individual; but, as Katz (1972: 191) suggests, the charge of "being a thief" associated with the charge of theft cannot be scientifically verified without the imputation of a negative ontological status (essence). This necessarily implies that the designation of deviance constitutes a moral judgment which exists as an "essentializing" element. This judgment employs the postulated notion of the individual's "substantial self" (Douglas, 1970: 388). Thus, deviance is construed as being the result of symbolic interaction allowing for the possibility of a negative state-of-being rather than a designation of the inherent characteristic of an act. Moral judgments, then, are inherent in the formulation of that law which circumscribes "public morality" (Quinney, 1975: 254).

The labeling perspective as it has developed within the sociology of deviance has called attention to the subjective nature of definitional statements of categorical deviance. This recognition has led to a subsequent emphasis on the impact of labeling on the self--an impact which is a result of the ontological imputation of a negative essence. The internalization of this negative essence cannot be imposed on the self but must result from a belief in its relevance to the individual.

#### Phenomenology and Deviance

A recent shift in orientation within the sociology of deviance has involved attempts to conjoin the interactionist perspective with a phenomenological approach. This merger has emphasized the intersubjective qualities of perceived deviant phenomena. Incorporating Schutzian social psychology, this orientation focuses upon the everyday world of the individual as the typifying structure through

which deviant phenomenon (in the Durkheimian tradition) play a major role in order maintenance (Douglas, 1970; Erickson, 1966; and Shoham, 1975).

The approach taken by phenomenological sociologists of deviance is based upon a view of social structure as an aspect of everyday life. Following from the observation of W. I. Thomas that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences," a concentration on the morality and respectability of mundane social existence has become a central focal concern for these theorists (Rock, 1972: 20-27).

Rock (1972) suggests that to allow perceptions of mundane social structure into a genuinely phenomenological analysis is contrary to the necessity of abstraction for sociological explanation. An epistemological synthesis of phenomenism with Verstehen is not possible when the deviance and immorality of a specific phenomena are emphasized.<sup>3</sup> These taken-for-granted categorical meanings, instead, must yield a basis for an examination of subjective characteristics and effects of deviant phenomenon upon these categories of social relations which yield objective circumstances (Rock, 1972: 24-25). To accept the existence of core values in a society is to reify an order as sui generis and is not representative of a phenomenological approach to the social construction of reality or the subjective perception of that reality in the form of individual consciousness. Berger and Luckmann hold that, by definition, the reified world is a dehumanized world "in which man loses (or is denied) the cognizance of his authorship of the world and the sense of the dialectical interplay between man the producer and society the product" (1967: 89). It is not sufficient, however, for deviance to be

viewed as categorical imputations of a negative status. Instead, emphasis also must be placed upon the perception of this imputation on the subjective level and the possibility of the negotiation of the meanings applied to the imputational action.

Thus, if sociologists of deviance are to adequately describe the phenomena, a theoretical framework must be delineated which accounts for the human construction of moral meanings embodied in social reality. It is not sufficient to imply that since a certain form of behavior is viewed by its participants as embodying a negative and/or different state-of-being, that it necessarily represents a transgression of existing "core values." Instead, an explanation for deviance must be advanced which clarifies the origins of meaning attached to a deviant act embodied in the imputation of an ontological status reflecting those values which are perceived to exist. This involves an examination of the process of deviance creation which has been the central concern of the labeling perspective (Schur, 1975: 288-290). Such a process may exist on the public level, as in situations where alienated power is based on authority relations, or it may exist on the level of intersubjective, everyday existence. These two levels of rule creation and hence deviance creation serve to accentuate the dialectical relation between the official reality embodied in formal political rules to a "deviant" reality which may be a product of an imputed identity resulting from the internalization of typified behavioral expectations.

Rotenberg has attempted to spell out a basic orientation toward the phenomena of self labeling which, in his estimation, serves as a "missing link" in the societal reaction theory of deviance. In outlining instances of self-labeling from which "deviant" identities arise, Rotenberg states that



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viewed as categorical imputations of a negative status. Instead, emphasis also must be placed upon the perception of this imputation on the subjective level and the possibility of the negotiation of the meanings applied to the imputational action.

Thus, if sociologists of deviance are to adequately describe the phenomena, a theoretical framework must be delineated which accounts for the human construction of moral meanings embodied in social reality. It is not sufficient to imply that since a certain form of behavior is viewed by its participants as embodying a negative and/or different state-of-being, that it necessarily represents a transgression of existing "core values." Instead, an explanation for deviance must be advanced which clarifies the origins of meaning attached to a deviant act embodied in the imputation of an ontological status reflecting those values which are perceived to exist. This involves an examination of the process of deviance creation which has been the central concern of the labeling perspective (Schur, 1975: 288-290). Such a process may exist on the public level, as in situations where alienated power is based on authority relations, or it may exist on the level of intersubjective, everyday existence. These two levels of rule creation and hence deviance creation serve to accentuate the dialectical relation between the official reality embodied in formal political rules to a "deviant" reality which may be a product of an imputed identity resulting from the internalization of typified behavioral expectations.

Rotenberg has attempted to spell out a basic orientation toward the phenomena of self labeling which, in his estimation, serves as a "missing link" in the societal reaction theory of deviance. In outlining instances of self-labeling from which "deviant" identities arise, Rotenberg states that

there is a difference between labeling certain behaviors "melancholic" or "schizophrenic" and reversing the dialectic by saying you behave in that manner because "you are schizophrenic." That is, the dependent variable (schizophrenia) is fallaciously taken as the independent variable (1974: 337).

This categoric label which is perceived as the primary origin of deviance within the individual refers "to one's basic social and self-identity and is related to one's position, rank, sex, class, etc. It categorically classifies one, in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others, as a 'success' or failure, 'as 'in' or 'out,' 'good' or 'bad' " (Rotenberg, 1974: 340). This representation of the constitution of a deviant identity is similar to Berger and Luckmann's concept of a reified identity or total self in which there is a "total identification of the individual with his socially assigned typifications. He is apprehended as nothing but that type" (1967: 91) which results in the conferring of a "master status" (Rock, 1974: 169).<sup>4</sup> Secondary role performance, as viewed by Berger and Luckmann, exists in anonymity where it may be detached from the actors involved. This anonymity and detachment of one's self from roles when incorporated in active perceptions of reality enables the individual to bracket or suspend "objective" belief in his secondary role relations. Thus, realizing the subjective nature of secondary roles enables the individual to "detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality as relevant only to the role-specific situation in question" (1967: 143). This ability exists, Berger and Luckmann argue, so long as the individual does not incorporate a reified identity (1967: 143). A reified identity fails to recognize the symbolic distinction between the public and private dimensions of social life. Authorship of one's destiny is perceived to exist outside the intentional acts of men engaging in intersubjective existence, and is located in higher moral sources construed as

"objective." Thus, an imposition of negative essence which is internalized by an individual will possibly result in the production of a deviant identity since the individual's behavior is perceived and internalized as a moral transgression of a unified and consensual totality.

This implication that deviance is an instance of an a priori ontological categorization of an individual's self is consistent with the phenomenological interpretation of action in the work of Alfred Schutz (1970) and his concern with the "problem of relevance." Schutzian analysis of action may be described as an attempt to integrate Weber's conception of meaning to a position which takes the "entire status of meaning in social action" and examines the philosophical structure of intention focusing on the "time structure of action" (Natanson, 1970: 104).<sup>5</sup> Schutz' work is primarily a "discussion of motivational understanding of human action" (Weigert, 1975: 101).

For Schutz, action and its content presents itself to the individual as a series of existing and present experiences which are passing away to be replaced by anticipated action guided by the interpretation of past action which is grasped monothetically in terms of an act. This interpretation of past action in terms of its meaning, however, is not an attached element conferred to the act through "predication." Instead, "meaning is bound to the very conception of action and must be understood as vital to its formulation" (Natanson, 1970: 10). Therefore, action and act exist in a dialectical relation one with the other. Each superimposes itself upon the other in terms of anticipated or phantasied action which is future oriented and thus meaningful only in terms of individual consciousness projected in a corresponding act (Natanson, 1970: 104-106). Schutz also describes

the process through which action obtains meaning in terms of motivational relevances which are constituted by "in-order-to motives" and the "because-motive." These motivational relevances exist in a mutual relation to interpretational relevances and topical relevances. As the stock of knowledge--which represents the "sedimentation of various activities of our mind," guided by the operative relevances--is oriented to an object of interest, we are conscious of the topical relevances.<sup>6</sup> These topical relevances in turn provide an object of interest for the implementation of motivational relevances consisting of the in-order-to motives which embody the subjective intentionality of an actor and the because-motive which imputes reflective meaning to the act. The interpretational relevances, on the other hand, serve to guide the mind in the perception of taken-for-granted phenomena or topics which result in typifications.

These typifications are dependent upon a reflective grasp of meaning which may be identified with either on-going experience (in terms of action) or past experience through reflective meaning attached to an act. Meaning attached to particular aspects of previous experiences may have an internalized "monothetic" interpretation which serves to facilitate an "habituated possession of knowledge." Weigert indicates that these "motivational relevances are, in general, 'sedimentations' or previous experiences, once topically or interpretationally relevant . . . , which led to a permanent habitual possession of knowledge" (1975: 95).

This sedimentation of knowledge serves to circumvent the innovative character of motivational relevances as leading to new topical relevances. The sedimentation of knowledge appears to the individual as a taken-for-granted reality



or typification which Sacks (1972) attributes to the interaction of characteristic phenomena. The first element of the typificatory structure consists of the "consistency rule" which implies that the relation between two variables or perceived types is mediated and given placement through an informational item or category conferring a taken-for-granted reality to particularistic identifications. The second rule is referred to as the "economy rule" which serves to confer practical relevance upon one interpretational device to the exclusion of other explanatory mechanisms (1972: 31-34).<sup>7</sup>

The emphasis on monothetic meaning in relation to past action is evident in the phenomenological approach to deviant behavior. Lofland indicates that during an escalation from the actor's pivotally normative interpretation of self to the encapsulation of the actor's self into a deviant identity, the ordering of one's biography into a consistent Gestalt facilitates the capacity of the individual to view self and identity as deviant (1969: 148-149). During this shift in self-perception from a pivotal self in flux between deviance and normality to a Gestalt interpretation (which adds essential meaning to one's biographical identity) -- past action is redefined by imposing a monothetic meaning to the building of polythetic structure (biographical experiences) and may result in the self-labeling of the individual as a deviant with an accompanying "moral" essence.

The informal process of self-labeling is located in the everyday relationships of intersubjective actions among interactive agents (Hawkins and Tiedeman, 1975: 75). Schur defines deviance in the following manner:

Human behavior is deviant to the extent that it comes to be viewed as involving a personally discreditable departure from

a group's normative expectations, and it elicits interpersonal or collective reactions that serve to "isolate," "treat," "correct," or "punish" individuals engaged in such behavior (1970: 24).

This subjectivist definition of deviance represents an emphasis upon a more symbolic and processual position than Becker's earlier formulation (1963: 9). It was Becker who argued that deviant behavior is behavior which is so labeled. Schur (1970) explicitly states what Becker implied when he suggested that "the deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied" (Becker, 1963: 9). This conceptualization of deviance is dependent upon typifications of human action in terms of the "dialectical relation of the 'ego' to the 'self.'" Natanson indicates that the self is actually "the ego which has a concrete biography, a continuous experience, and a specific orientation toward the future in terms of projects and dispositions. The self is the ego clothed with the garments of society" (1970: 17). However, these projects and dispositions must not be interpreted to mean that the self is an object of mere social manipulation. Rather, as Blumer argues (1969: 64), the self stands ~~over~~ and against everyday interaction in a position of response instead of mere reception. The generalized other--through which the self realizes its meaning within the process of objectification--should not be construed as a "reified" construct. Following this "voluntaristic" emphasis on human activity, Mennell shows that dominant patterns of behavior cannot be treated as reflections of attitudes serving as "external stimuli which the individual passively absorbed and replicated" (1974: 17). Mead's orientation to the selection of action objects by the self is characterized in the following statement:

The human animal is an attentive animal. . . Our whole intelligent process seems to lie in the attention which is selective of certain

types of stimuli. . . Not only do we open the door to certain stimuli and close it to others, but our attention is an organizing as well as a selective. . . Our attention enables us to organize the field in which we are going to act (Mead, 1934: 25).

The dialectical components of the "I" and the "me" facilitate reflective action and enable the self to act towards itself as an object. This action of viewing self as an object is possible through the self's ability to take the role of the generalized other in symbolic interaction, which in turn enables the individual to "praise, blame, or encourage himself" (Manis and Meltzer, 1967: 9). It is a process of intuitive action which is dependent to previous reactions.

Hinkle (1972) indicates that

it is the "me" which answers to the organized attitudes of others and gives the "form" and structure to the self, while the "I" remains the unconventional, the novel, and the unpredictable (1972: 97).

Thus, in Mead's writing the "I" represents the "unpredictable" component of his theoretical orientation, whereas for Schutz the unpredictable components of his "theory of relevances" are represented through the intrinsic relevances (Weigert, 1975: 95).

#### Reactions to Stigma

The internalization of the expectations of "significant others" may elicit several responses from the individual who is interpersonally and/or institutionally stigmatized. Glaser (1971: 34-44) proposes three possible courses of action for individuals who experience a sense of stigma. The individual may (1) change his behavior so as to lose or neutralize the deviant label; (2) move to "enhance" the behavior to his self; or (3) redefine the behavior to self. Corresponding to these possible courses of action is Washburn's argument that the protective attitude

serves as a "constellation of related ideas by means of which the individual maintains, enhances, and defends the self" (1962: 85). Coopersmith subsequently presents self-protective mechanisms as

. . . the individual's capacity to define an event filled with negative implications and consequences in such a way that it does not detract from his sense of worthiness, ability, or power (1967: 37).

These self-protective components of the protective attitude enable the self to redefine the essential nature of stigma. Otherwise, the individual might experience a "crisis" of the essential self. Lofland, in the same context, suggests that

an occurrence is disorienting only if the Actor has no category with which effectively to designate the occurrence and no associated repertoire of coping responses which he can activate. . . However, it is unlikely that any Actor has a cognitive system so complex and articulated that no possible occurrence can fall outside the range of what he is already able to designate and manage. In this sense all Actors are, in one way or another to one degree or another, vulnerable to disorientation (1969: 182).

Highly educated individuals, then, are more able to effectively discount the validity of the deviant label and to offer alternative explanations of their actions. "Poorly educated, isolated and parochial persons are simply more likely to encounter events which to them are inexplicable, baffling, bewildering, incomprehensible and the like." Such events would lead them to seek out definitions of events from others (Lofland, 1969: 179-183).

In any event, a basic assumption of the interactionist perspective is that in instances where the individual senses a stigmatizing reaction from a significant other, he will attempt to remove self from exposure to this personally discrediting reaction. Lofland considers substitution of this negative Other for a more accepting and positive Other likely if the new significant other is helpful, and/or provides



"physical and emotional shelter and a rhetoric of defense" with "new possibilities for positive action" (Lofland, 1969: 188). Kaplan in further discussion of the self-esteem motive states that "individuals will tend to behave in ways that will offer maximum opportunity to develop, maintain, or improve positive self-attitudes" (1975: 242).<sup>8</sup> Hawkins and Tiedemann split the social identity into the self-image ("How does the individual nominatively define himself? Does he conceive himself as deviant or conventional?") and the self-esteem ("How does the individual feel about his total self as he sees it? Does he have positive or negative feelings of self-worth?") (1975: 242). This component (self-esteem) of the self corresponds directly to Katz's (1972) notion of the "ontological status" of deviance and infers a condition of negotiation of the subjective effects of the deviant label.

In instances where the individual experiences feelings of negative self-esteem (whether it is from public labeling or self-labeling through interactional meanings drawn from symbolic, typified action) the actor becomes disoriented and is susceptible to outside influences. These may result in an internalization of definitional meaning from others, which in turn may stabilize in a deviant identity (Hawkins and Tiedemann, 1975: 245-246). Of particular interest in the discussion of the self-esteem motive and its relation to identity transformation is Schutz's contention that the building of new biographical and typificatory experiences necessitates the introduction of "new" categories or symbolic carriers of meaning. He contends that "it is quite possible that a shift in the system of interpretational relevances--as with the introduction of a new conceptualization--becomes the starting point for building up a set of new motivational or topical relevances which do not thus far pertain to the familiar stock of knowledge at hand" (1970: 70).

Schutz further argues that a strange or atypical event "if it is interesting enough" will need to be investigated. This would necessitate a set of topical relevances leading to new motivational relevances. Also of importance to a discussion of identity transformation is the theory of interpretational relevances which "furnish the foundation of a theory of expectation and especially of problems of rationalization" (Schutz, 1970: 107). This view indicates that interpretational relevances, as they relate to explanations of social action through the perception of expectations, are related to the Schutzian reality transformation in which a vacancy caused by dropping a topic from one level of reality is reconstructed "by means of systems of relevances belonging to other levels of reality" (Schutz, 1970:107).

This, then, accounts for the internalization of monothetic meaning attached to a new concept of topical relevances which may be conveyed to the individual through symbolic interaction with "carriers" of this reality centering primarily upon the new topical relevance. Thus, the process of reality transformation may be dependent upon the social identification of self with a "we-union" in which other selves are members. This leads to the partners and the new member "not feeling separate and alone, but of being 'together,' 'united,' 'at one' or 'merged'" (Speigelberg, 1973: 142). This experience of a "we-union" is of central importance to the maintenance of a subuniverse of meaning and the building of a deviant substructure through an ideological belief in the essential characteristics of the phenomena.

Noting that "it is only in the communal context that a person can survive," Miyamoto (1970) indicates that this survival is dependent upon the self's viewing of itself (through role taking) as desirable (accomplished through evaluation),

definable (seen through cognition), and gratifying (accomplished through the affective mode of experience orientation). The most personal or intimate mode is that of "evaluation" which exists in a "perceptual setting" where the self as an attitude object serves to receive positive or negative evaluations from significant others (Skidmore, 1975: 232-235). This mode of evaluation is similar to the "self-esteem" motive as delineated by Hawkins and Tiedemann (1975) and is dependent upon identification with a significant other.

In sum, the identification of self as deviant appears to have a curvilinear effect on the individual's self-esteem in that during ambiguous circumstances which violate typified conduct and are perceived to assert a deviant nature to the actor, there is an initial period of low self-esteem. However, if the individual comes to settle into a deviant identity with a subsequent shifting of reference groups or significant others, assuming a positive status will restore feelings of self-worth and a heightening of self-esteem (Hawkins and Tiedemann, 1975: 247).

The societal reaction perspective within the sociology of deviance has developed from an emphasis on deviance as the result of rule-breaking behavior to the inclusion of an orientation which takes the phenomena as a given or possible state-of-being. As a result of efforts to dereify the phenomena of deviance and thereby to identify it as a non-pathological form of social behavior, the labeling perspective has emphasized an "authentic" description of deviant reality as it is experienced by its members (Rock, 1972: 17).<sup>9</sup> This wedding of a phenomenological emphasis on meaning and the problematic character of social deviance to a structural approach which stresses the existence of subculture and marginality has led the perspective to an orientation that embodies two heretofore opposing

theoretical traditions (Phillipson and Roche, 1974: 143). The penumbral area between these two focusing points has been clarified through the application of the concept of secondary deviation. This concept directs attention to the individual's commitment to a deviant role in which the primary act is considered a possible constitutive and amplifying characteristic.

Sagarin and Kelly assert that the concept of secondary deviation (as it relates to sexual deviance) is not a necessary component of a sound theoretical framework within the labeling perspective (1975: 269). McAuliffe states that "there is obviously nothing about many forms of deviance, especially the behavioral kind which makes them inherently primary or secondary" (1975: 232).<sup>10</sup> The use of secondary deviation as a conceptual mechanism serves to reify the processual character of social deviance and has led to a belief in the "objective" existence of some social phenomena. Sagarin suggests that by conceptualizing deviant identities "as existing if one either commits the act or has a desire to do so," scholars of deviance imply that one may be a thief or any other categorical deviant simply by having the desire to engage in the designated behavior (1975: 147).

The questioning of the applicability of the categorical existence of secondary deviation to the processual identification of "self" as deviant, directs attention to the ultimate ontological meaninglessness of the official categorization of a form of behavior as deviant and denies the objective existence of "deviant" individuals. However, this questioning fails to recognize the dialectical relation of the categorical imputation of deviance to the phenomenological "meaning content" of moral imputations which lead some individuals to believe that they are deviant (Schur, 1975: 289).



### The Presentation of Deviant Reality

In his discussion of the practical activity of individuals in the process of reality transformation, Antonio Gramsci indicates that a "critical understanding of self takes place. . . through a struggle of political 'hegemonies' and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality" (1972: 323). Gramsci presents his view by indicating that

the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical fact, but part of the historical process, whose elementary and primitive phase is to be found in the sense of being "different" and "apart," in an instinctive feeling of independence, and which progresses to the level of real possession of a single and coherent conception of the world (1972: 333).

Therefore, a Marxian sociology of knowledge applied to the study of deviant behavior and deviance premises that self must be symbolically isolated to facilitate a subsequent existential identification with "carriers" of alternative symbolic realities (see Hamilton, 1974: 74).

The counter imputation of a positive status to the individual's feelings of self-worth is accomplished with an alternative interpretation of the essential characteristics of the behavior categorized as deviant by the "official" representatives of the symbolic universe. As such, the establishment of a deviant identity with a subsequent acceptance or generation of a positive ontological status is a representation of the social phenomena referred to by Berger and Luckmann as a "subuniverse of meaning" (1967: 86-89). The subuniverse of meaning promulgates a weltanschauung which is related to "concrete social interests of the group that holds it" (1967: 96). The establishment of a subuniverse of meaning involves the production of a body of knowledge existing in a dialectical relation to its social

base--the interests which generated the body of knowledge. This subuniverse of meaning also acts as a factor in social change which is dependent upon the on-going activities of social agents who believe in the objectiveness of its essential component. In the instance of behavior which is labeled as deviant by an "official ban" with concomitant institutional and interpersonal sanctions, the production of a subuniverse of meaning which imputes a positive state-of-being to actors faces the special problem of dereification of the negative status ascribed to the action. In instances where a group attempts a dereification of the reality of meaning attached to a form of behavior, social marginality is observed to be a general characteristic of that phenomenon by Berger and Pullberg. They indicate that "such marginality may take a large number of different social forms--ethnic (e.g. 'guest peoples'), religious (e.g. hermits and ascetics withdrawing from society), moral (e.g. the marginal worlds creating by crime and vice), or political (e.g. political elites)" (1965: 209).

The marginality ascribed to individuals in the realm of "crime" and "vice" may result in the sedimentation of meaning structure into the solidification of a deviant identity. The presentation of this reality by individuals whose behavior is sanctioned by the perceived symbolic universe receives its concrete manifestation in the form of groups of individuals subscribing to a central ideological position. The presentation of this "deviant" reality (embodying a subuniverse of meaning) is an inherent characteristic of voluntary associations representing deviants and comprising a more or less autonomous entity which affixes an ideological meaning to a form of behavior in terms of essentialism (see Sagarin, 1968).

In referring to the symbolic universe--within which there are many sub-universes of meaning--Berger and Luckmann indicate that "the symbolic universe orders and thereby legitimates everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures by placing them. . . in the context of the most general frame of reference conceivable" (1967: 99). However, the subuniverse of meaning has the capacity to act back on the collectivity which produced it (1967: 86). Any attempt to integrate a "deviant" subuniverse of meaning necessitates a dereification of that behavior. This is considered a necessity, since on a symbolic level behavior recognized as undesirable by the official definers of reality or significant others who impute a negative meaning to the behavior carries a negative ontological status which is objectively defined by the symbolic universe.

The transition to the ascription of significance to a different Other (giving the deviance a positive status) involves a period of disorientation where the individual may be influenced by several "others." This is a subjective process since it depends on the human production of moral meaning and allows the inhabitants of a particular subuniverse of meaning to deny the legitimacy of the negatively reified status of their behavior as a moral construction based upon "alienated" power interests. The objectiveness of the categorical placement of the behavior as "deviant" and "bad" is challenged with an alternative meaning which appears to be subjective to the representatives and members of the symbolic universe, but which at the same time is presented and believed to be objective (in terms of moral imputation) by the members who produce it.

Sallach, in his efforts to propose a "phenomenological Marxism," indicates that any attempt to change a prevailing institution necessitates dereification.

The practical task of changing societal institutions means that: (1) the member is no longer atomized, for, if he is to have a chance at success, he is forced to join with other members whose interests he shares; (2) the member must view societal institutions not as "imposed relevances" which form part of the objective (reified) parameters of the everyday world, but as human-created historical formulations which must be understood concretely to be changed (including an understanding of the humans who subjectively administer such institutions); and, consequently, (3) the member is required to learn that his "individuated" world is not totally subjective (but has been partially formed by objective processes, nor are institutional relevances totally objective, but may be influenced or changed by the member's conscious intervention) (1973: 36).

### Summary

The process of substituting references to positive oriented significant others is a humanly produced phenomena which necessitates a reflective consciousness stripping the stigma of its ideological foundation and revealing its subjective nature. The movement to a state-of-being which imputes a positive status to the behavior is also subjective, since the individual may either change his behavior, enhance his behavior, or dialectically interpret the imputation of stigma to produce an alternative ideological position to that given by the symbolic universe.

Within a Marxian sociology of knowledge the process of identity transformation which was examined in this chapter represents a realm of qualitative social praxis. The denial of essential meanings conferred to categories through a "fetichized morality" enables an "individual's" reality to be reconstituted through processes of qualitative dereification within an "identity" transformation.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>These ontological states-of-being, however, are not metaphysical in origin but are a direct result of a "we-union" that serves to unify self's experience in a categorical identification (see Speigelberg, 1973: 139).

<sup>2</sup>Schwartz and Skolnick (1962: 133-142) provide valuable insights into the difficulties which formal labeling has for individuals attempting to obtain employment in legitimate occupations.

<sup>3</sup>This conception of Verstehen refers to the usage as outlined by Rock (1972) and Leat (1972).

Verstehen can propel analysis towards phenomenalism. However, the two styles of thought cannot always be disentangled from one another. Verstehen must always have formalist implications. Constellations of symbols can never be treated as if they had unique properties because their description necessarily depends upon ideas which are external to them. Any useful application of Verstehen must end in the production of categories of meaning (Rock, 1972: 23).

Leat also indicates the existence of two possible conceptualizations of Verstehen. Erkaldendes Verstehen refers to the achievement of designating a form of behavior as "part of an understandable sequence of events," whereas "aktuelles Verstehen is concerned with understanding the meaning of a given act" (1972: 32-33).

For a classic interpretation of the method of Verstehen as related to "scientific" sociology see Abel (1948) with a critical comment on Abel's interpretation by Wax (1967) and a reply (Abel, 1967).

<sup>4</sup>Reification of identity is most aptly represented through the interpretation of social products of an individual in terms of an outstanding characteristic ascribed to that individual. Thus, the individual comes to view the essential self in objective terms through psychologistic validation of the "real self" (see Berger, 1965: 35-44).

<sup>5</sup>The concept of meaning in Weber's work is considered in terms of Verstehen or categorical, subjective meaning. This is evident in O'Neill's discussion of Weber's inquiry into the meaning of "science."

With [the imputation of subjective order] says Weber, "we come to inquire into the meaning of science. For, after all, it is not self-evident that something subordinate to such a law is sensible and meaningful in itself. Why does one engage in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come to an end" (1972: 5).

<sup>6</sup> In this context the concept of "mind" refers to past intersubjective experiences and the sedimentation of these experiences grasped monothetically into a "stock-of-knowledge."

<sup>7</sup> An analogous function is represented by the primarily cultural device referred to in the Marxian perspective as "ideological hegemony."

<sup>8</sup> In their discussion of "motive" as a way of conceiving social action, Blum and McHugh indicate that "motive is not. . . a thing in the world but a way of conceiving social action." Thus, the self-esteem motive exists as a subjective interpretation of social behavior which acquires its "analytical force as observer's rules for depicting grounds of conduct" (1971: 99).

<sup>9</sup> This "authenticity" is represented by the interactionist emphasis on the presentation of values of subordinate positions of power in society and a reluctance to reify first-order meaning through conceptual mechanisms imputing "causality" to phenomena designated as deviant (see Becker, 1968).

<sup>10</sup> In the sociology of deviance individuals who seek a marginal position are accounted for as label-seekers. Schur (1971: 20) asserts that in some instances the knowledge of a categorical, negative label attached to an individual's significant other may lead to acts of deviation based upon perceived behavioral expectations.

## CHAPTER II

### ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS AND PHANTASIED SOCIAL ACTION: THE POSSIBILITIES OF LEGITIMATE SOCIAL PRAXIS

The possibility of a Marxian sociology of knowledge based upon an analysis of the formation of social blocs or masses identifying with an ideological position is addressed in this chapter. The Marxian sociology formulated by Antonio Gramsci emphasized the notion of social praxis and intersubjective action and is related to the formation of phenomenological "we-unions." These "we-unions" engage in activities which serve to legitimate a deviant form of identity.

Voluntary associations are conceptualized as a manifestation of phenomenological "we-unions" and can be differentiated through their collective-representation-of-self. The collective self is evident in the language community initiated by the group towards the "public." The orientation presented in this thesis does not attempt to evaluate the success of the association but, following the recommendations of Henkin, focuses "upon the criteria of success used and defined by these groups" (1970: 663). These criteria are revealed through ideological manifestations which serve to symbolically integrate specific associations and provide the association's members with systems of relevance. These relevances tend to provide the associations with legitimate possibilities for social praxis.

### Marxian Sociology of Knowledge

A division has been apparent historically within the field of the sociology of knowledge. The division centers around the Marxist notion of ideology and the "phenomenological explanation of our social knowledge" (Martin, 1968: 334). The orientation toward social order which utilizes the notion of ideology designates political legitimacy and the imputation of "objectiveness" inherent in social relations as a product of ideological hegemony (Sallach, 1974: 38). Within this orientation, social and political stability is maintained through the legitimacy conferred upon specific ideological views with the exclusion of others (Bridges, 1974 and Sallach, 1974).

The phenomenological dimension of the sociology of knowledge, however, approaches reality as an ever-changing social construction through its emphasis upon the "subjective" perceptions of social actors. Within this frame of reference the process of human externalization as the anthropological base of society is emphasized (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), and attention is directed toward the imputation of "alienated power" as employed by social agents. The phenomenological emphasis serves to legitimize behavior through interactive legitimations that value "the transformation of existing institutions" (Miller, 1972: 123).

The first dimension (ideology) emphasized the political aspects of hegemony and its interrelation to the economic base of the capitalist state (Bridges, 1974). This dimension of the sociology of knowledge is oriented toward the explanation of structural arrangements which render unaccountable the intentionality and the "authenticity" of super-structural change by social agents, while it discounts the



democratic state as a "phantasm" (Manders, 1975: 56-57). This approach toward knowledge and ideology assumes a materialist base in both causal and historical relation to the super-structure which is identified as the range of social relations (Piccone, 1971). This objectivist assumption, drawn from the "scientific" Marx, identifies knowledge or ideational systems which do not reflect a Marxist ontology (materialist) as a manifestation of "false consciousness" (Sallach, 1974).

The approach to Marxian sociology of knowledge embodied in this thesis does not implement an objectivist orientation to consciousness but, instead, begins with the phenomenological assumption that all consciousness is "authentic" (Lichtheim, 1964). Therefore, as Gramsci (1972) argues, Marxism becomes an ideology which may be subjected to phenomenological analysis. The ideological identification of Marxian characteristics assigned specific modes of consciousness are related to an orientation toward "social praxis," instead of being oriented toward super-structural relations to the "material" base.

Ideological hegemony, then, is a reflexive phenomena through which symbolic meanings convey "possibilities" and orient actors toward legitimate objects of consciousness. These legitimate objects of consciousness represent the structural phenomena within a subuniverse of meaning (see Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 76).

An analysis of a subuniverse of meaning entails a rigorous phenomenological interpretation of meaning structure and its outward manifestation in the form of an ideology. Shiner indicates that "phenomenological analysis. . . is not just any description, but the description of 'essence'. . . the essences phenomenologists

are talking about are not 'real'. . . they are idealities belonging to the interplay of consciousness and the world" (1969: 264). A deviant subuniverse of meaning, then, derives its origin from the internalization of stigma. Individuals who perceive themselves as deviant and internalize stigma "will interpret their acts in phenomenally immediate terms," but "the first order constructs employed by these actors" must be open to scrutiny by sociologists and not accepted as objective or essential (Rock, 1972: 149). Rock specifies the inherent incapacity of an orientation which relies solely on first-order constructs to delineate the complex of categorical relations to negotiable moral content

because no area of two-dimensional space can be occupied by more than one element, moral choices must be made between discrete alternatives. . . Only a few deviancy sociologists suggest that they can support more than one set of "values" simultaneously; that "values" are not neatly separable from one another in all settings; or that contexts play a vital role in shaping which values will become salient and what significance they will acquire (1974: 146).

The analysis of meaning structures embodied in a subuniverse of meaning, then, has relevance at two levels. First, the level of intersubjective identification which is oriented to the relation of the individual "deviant" to other "deviants" or sympathizers to that reality, and, second, the instrumental level that orients attention to the perceived relation of that specific subuniverse of meaning to the outside society.<sup>1</sup> There is, therefore, a split between the phenomenological dimension of the subuniverse of meaning which orients attention to the intersubjective embodiments of meanings with accompanying interactive elements and the ideological dimension of the subuniverse of meaning which orients consideration to perceived "structural" determinants of problems associated with the state-of-being embodied

in the subuniverse of meaning. The phenomenological dimension places emphasis on the subjective effects of problems involved in the identification of self as "deviant." The ideological dimension, on the other hand, emphasizes specific components of the total ideology (symbolic universe) as determinants of the deviant condition (stigma) through particularistic ideological configurations.<sup>2</sup> Krause (1969) presents an adequate definition of "ideology:"

An ideology can be defined as any word, set of phrases, or text which is used by one group. . . and directed at another group for the purpose of politically organizing and activating the target group to behave in a way which will be in the basic self-interest of the proponents (1969: 548).

These two conflicting perceptions of moral order (total ideology and particular ideology) are mediated by the political phenomena of the state with its explications of formal rules protecting "civil rights." As Spiegelberg (1973: 44-45) has indicated, "we-talk" when implemented to designate a "we-phenomena" is dependent on the interdependence of several partners perspective in a "we-union." Gussow and Tracy indicate that an ideological transformation of reality requires that "persons involved in the stigmatized condition are engaged in close and sufficient prolonged interaction" and that "the stigmatized are sufficiently free of daily encroachment on their lives by dissonant public views" (1971: 259).

The state, acting as a mediating agent between opposing we-phenomena, constitutes a dialectical entity which is dependent for its existence upon the externalizing and intersubjective nature of social beings. As such, it is an embodiment of alienated power. Within this orientation perceptions of deviance become linked to historical interpretation since the dialectical process of externalization consists of past events (acts), present action, and future or phantasied action. Wolfe, in

the delineation of a Marxian orientation vis-a-vis the state, indicates that we must view any theory of the capitalist state within the framework of alienated power (1974: 155-157).<sup>4</sup> The phenomena of alienated power when construed as the basis of the modern state with its accompanying institutions may be applied not only to the modern capitalist state, but also to the state as an entity (see Bender, 1975: 33-52). The state in this context becomes an exponent of "fetichized morality" since it provides the ideological mechanisms to publicly ban or publicly enhance categorical forms of social action. Therefore, the investigation of alienated power relies upon an analysis of ideology and hegemony since ideology is not only practiced but is also lived in as if it were an objective reality (Bridges, 1974). Viewing the structural components of knowledge as ideology and hegemony--interplay of categorical "possibilities" to the individual self--definitions invariably hold the possibility of generating opposition through reconstituting those imputations as "alien."

The consolidation of this "sense" of alienation (stigma) into a voluntary association enables the we-partners to promulgate alternative ideological forms. These ideological foci represent orientations toward social change and are identified within the Marxian sociology of knowledge specified herein as "phantasied" social praxis. This conception is utilized from Antonio Gramsci's (1972) work toward a Marxian sociology of knowledge. Gramsci takes as a basic premise the necessity of a "democratic" state for the transformation of advanced capitalist society and its accompanying hegemony of meaning (Salamini, 1974). For Gramsci, hegemony is ideological (socio-cultural) first and only secondly a political fact (Salamini, 1974: 368). Manders, however, asserts that



. . . for Gramsci; and for us, the ideological manipulation of consciousness is most definitely a category of "social control." For the political-coercive power of the capitalist state is itself grounded in the fact that most men and women grant it the right to monopolize "legitimate" violence and to use it for the maintenance of the capitalist order (1975: 58).

Gramsci stresses the belief that ideological hegemony is a necessary condition for the seizure of state power and the creation of a new state. The proletariat, he contends, can and must become a dominant class before becoming a ruling class (Salamini, 1974: 368).<sup>5</sup>

Although Gramsci considers the manipulation of consciousness an aspect of social control and order (Manders, 1975: 58), the knowledge systems attached to these institutions are subjective, "human" products.

Objective always means "humanly objective" which corresponds exactly to "historically subjective": in other words, objective would mean "universally subjective." Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary cultural system (Gramsci, 1972: 445).

Thus, for Gramsci, Marxism is an ideology since all knowledge short of its unification into a "human" culture is ideological (Salamini, 1975: 67). To Gramsci, however, Marxism is the most encompassing "ideology of all, which does not aim at mystifying human existence but is rather the expression of man's human values" (Salamini, 1974: 365).<sup>6</sup>

Bauman interprets Gramsci's epistemological views of science and the problem of values.

The way toward dismantling the foundations of the positivist ascendancy does not lead through the questioning of the human right to fuse interest with knowledge, but through challenging the assumed monopoly of the "real" as the source of valid knowledge. Which is not to say that all knowledge is not valid; the "natural"

laws of political economy Antonio Gramsci would say, hold well in so far as the human masses behave in the ordinary, routine, monotonous, perfunctory way habitual in an alienated society; in so far as they do, one can easily reply on the apparent repetitiousness of the observed phenomena as the foundation of a trustworthy knowledge. But the allegedly secure basis goes topsy-turvy the very moment that the masses [or a specific sub-altern class] emerge from their comatose compliance and embark on an "unusual," "unlawful," "improbable," "unwarranted" adventure (1974: 169).

The basic shortcoming of Bauman's analysis, however, lies in his inability to identify the process of "building" these masses which is also an important aspect of Gramsci's sociology of knowledge. Gramsci realized that in order to have a "mass" ideology as an aspect of "total" culture, it must be recognized as man-made. This proposition serves to tie its otherwise seeming "objectiveness" to history and, therefore, to subjectivity. This, as we shall see, contrasts sharply with Mannheim's conception of totality and ideology.

#### Mannheim, Gramsci and the Sociology of Knowledge

Karl Mannheim is considered a major proponent for the sociology of knowledge which exists outside the Marxian paradigm. His work (1936, 1943), however, does not allow for the intersubjective production of knowledge through voluntaristic action (Farberman, 1970).

Gramsci's view of knowledge as a product of intersubjective existence varies from that of Mannheim, who identifies social thought and its accompanying reality as "perspectivistic," in that it "derives from a standpoint located in the historical and social context" (Miller, 1972: 123). Mannheim indicates that

. . . given values can always be interpreted both as a means of adjustment to real situations, and as types of adjustment which

are directed by a particular Weltanschauung. . . Justification of a type of behavior as being an efficient piece of adjustment to a given situation does not yet determine its being right or wrong (1943: 145-148).

Mannheim and Gramsci differ importantly in their differentiation of knowledge and ideology. For Gramsci, all knowledge--including "scientific" knowledge--is ideological, and will remain so, short of the cultural and political unification of the human race (Salamini, 1974; 1975). Mannheim, on the other hand, believes that "scientific" knowledge as related to the natural sciences may achieve objectivity. He replaces the quest for knowledge of the factual objectivity of social relations within the "socially unattached intelligentsia" which appears to Mannheim "as the predestined advocates of the intellectual interests of the whole" (Gerth and Bramstedt, 1951: IX). Thus, for Mannheim social knowledge is ultimately based on second order constructs of consciousness, and are, therefore, "relative." However, it may reach the "relational" level through the perspective of an unattached intelligentsia which espouses knowledge that is not attached to a "class base."

Salamini delineates the differences in the standpoints of Marx, Mannheim, and Gramsci concerning the relation of ideology to knowledge.

Marx, Mannheim, and Gramsci all agree on the necessity of identifying knowledge and ideology. What sets them apart from each other . . . is the notion of ideology. For Marx, ideology denotes a set of ideas which reflects the social existence in a deformed, illusory, and mystifying form. Gramsci gives to it a positive connotation and value. Ideology is a theory in direct relationship to human praxis; it is in fact on the level of ideology that man becomes conscious of social conflict (1974: 377).

Arguing against the notion of the objectivity of "bourgeois" sociological methodology, Gramsci contends that "the validity of such methodology presupposes and is the result of the masses' lack of critical consciousness and their political

passivity" (Salamini, 1974: 377; 1975: 72). The collective and critical consciousness of subaltern classes (subordinate social groups) takes place through identification with specific ideologies embodying "particular hegemonic force" (Gramsci, 1972: 332-334). This indicates that Gramsci's delineation of the relation of civil society to the state in terms of a "war of position"--a process which Gramsci identifies with the "democratic" West--is opposed to a "war of manoeuvre"--which he considers a characteristic of the East. "Class conflict becomes for Gramsci the visible conflict of another profounder [sic] type of conflict, that of a confrontation of rival Weltanschauungen" (Salamini, 1974: 377).

While Mannheim believed social objectivity possible through the "synthesis of partial perspectives" achieved by the "socially unattached intelligentsia" (Gerth and Bramstedt, 1951: IX), Gramsci placed the struggle for objectivity on the level of intersubjective existence. The tendency toward the unification of social groups is seen by Gramsci as continually interrupted by the ruling groups and "can only be demonstrated when a historical cycle is completed and that cycle culminates in a success" (Gramsci, 1972: 55).

#### Marxian Sociology of Knowledge and the Subuniverse of Meaning

Mannheim's belief that the imputation of perspective serves a mediating function between the social setting and the content of thought (Miller, 1972: 128), is characteristic of the sociology of deviance in relation to the production of a subuniverse of meaning attached to a categorical, deviant act. A deviant identity is the result of dialectical processes between the preconceptual (stigma) and categorical



(identification of an object) dimensions of reality which represent a self-made phenomena molded through social-psychological processes.

Sahay (1972) indicates that a basic limitation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is its inability to specify the nature of social contexts from which ideology is constructed.

If it is possible to describe an ideology in Mannheimian terms, it refers to the premise of the social context as the total determinant of all action. So, without a specific formulation on the relationship of the social context and ideology, i.e. which aspects in the general social context relate to the defining element of ideology--even a analytical description of actual, historical ideologies is impossible. This descriptive form is in fact the limit of Mannheim's empirical applicability of the whole of sociology of knowledge. . . In Mannheim there is no analytic attempt to define the social context; in other words, there is no methodology for analyzing the manifest reality of ideologies and utopias (129).

A subuniverse of meaning is a consequence of the interplay of typified interactional constructs which impute essential meanings to acts. This imputation is accomplished through the response of individuals to internalized stigma. Stigmatized individuals may collectively define the source of internalized stigma by producing an alternative essential meaning to the source of stigma (Speigelberg, 1973). This alternative explanation of the deviant phenomena is a product of Gramscian "organic" intellectuals. These organic intellectuals give direction to the ideas and meanings generated within the we-union of which they are members (Gramsci, 1972: 3).

The imputation of perspective orders social reality and provides an ontological frame of reference which in turn yields an ideological structure of meaning. This structure of meaning or weltanschauung influences perceptions of social reality through the promulgation of conceptual and explanatory mechanisms resulting in the "objective" relevance of a particular reality to the pedagogy of its organic

intellectuals. The direction which is promulgated by this association in turn provides a historical dimension to the problematic situation which initially exposed the alienating condition. This guidance is presented through the formulation of topical and interpretative relevances for the collective-self.

The existence and examination of ideological structures of knowledge cannot be related to an orientation towards social change which is dependent upon an analysis of the various relations between those ideological structures of knowledge. Such an analysis should include an investigation of the alienated power of social agents over other social agents on the level of political or rational-legal rules involving the categorization of relations around a central or essential meaning conferred upon a specific phenomena.

Plummer (1975) points out the importance of an analysis of the relationship of alienated power on the intersubjective level of legitimations to the political relations of relevance for authority structures and competing ideological viewpoints.

An important factor in such analysis is that of power--where power of one interactant over another may have important consequences for the reaction outcome. While this is important on the level of routine day-to-day life, it is especially significant in understanding the work of crusading groups such as moral entrepreneurs who campaign for the control of pornography. . . and moral provocateurs who campaign for Gay Liberation (55).

Scott and Franklin (1973) also indicate that "as distinct interest groups evolve, organize, and disseminate information, such action may be reflected in our cultural values as portrayed by the mass media" (207). Following this line of inquiry, Warren and Johnson acknowledge the typified behavior patterns of deviant realities and also call attention to the stigma which may be imputed to members of this reality who seek to change their sense of identity.

Within the gay community, typifications of deviance include people who do not drink at parties, homosexuals wishing to be "cured" by psychiatrists. . . and those wishing to marry in order to construct a front of respectability to present to the larger society (1972: 81).

Thus, the legitimacy of the "community's" meaning structure is protected and its members are given a guide to interaction.

In the investigation of deviance the essential meaning conferred upon a social phenomena--designated politically as deviant or perceived as deviant through typified interaction--involves an unequal set of power relations. This constitutes an alienated imputation of power by one social agent over others. This imputation may lead to an individualized internalization of stigma.

The epistemological approach of the sociology of knowledge as employed in the study of deviant phenomena must direct attention to the subjective and ideological nature of categorical imputations and also lead to an analysis of deviant substructure (Rock, 1972: 24-25). The analysis of "deviant" substructures and their accompanying universes of meaning necessitates an examination of the categorical relevance of Verstehen to phenomenism as related to the production of a deviant subuniverse of meaning. That is, one must consider the interplay of "identifiable" categories of social action with the production of subjective meanings within these forms.

The theoretical components of an approach to deviance within the methodological framework of a Marxian sociology of knowledge are constituted by the interactionist approach's emphasis on the societal reaction as the source of the internalized stigma through categorical imputations of "difference," and a phenomenological emphasis on the meanings individuals attach to these reactions and

accompanying typified expectations of Others. The experience of stigma as a result of the imputation of "alienated power" and negative essence--with subsequent interaction among other stigmatized individuals--leads to the possibility of a "we-union" conferring a positive essence upon the behavior and its identifying element. The perceived nature of the source from which the stigma is to have originated leads to an emphasis on either cultural and/or structural determinants of the stigmatized condition. An emphasis upon culture as a determinant of stigma is reflected in a belief in the objective characteristics of social institutions, whereas an emphasis upon social structure as the determinant of the stigma leads to a belief in the subjective nature of social institutions with concomitantly identifiable ideological interests (Sallach, 1973: 36). Thus, the notion of "social praxis" serves as a differentiating factor between "we-unions."

#### The Manifestation of Deviant Substructure

Philosophically, the existence of a categorical and therefore relativized conception of deviation is a necessary result of the congruity principle which is relied upon for any explanation since "unity" is considered an a priori characteristic of "understanding" (Shoham, 1974: 28). The congruity principle is evident in the sociology of deviance through the symbolic interactionist tenet that individuals react affirmatively to situations which are perceived to embody positive implications for self-concept (see Hammersmith and Weinberg, 1973: 50) and the phenomenological assumption that social action yields typified patterns of behavior with accompanying essential meanings, thus serving to unify experience. As a consequence, the categorical internalization of stigma may result in the collective identification of individuals around a central and essential meaning conferred upon a form of



social action. The ideological presentation of this collective identification is a product of voluntary associations of individuals representing and identifying with the deviant phenomena.

These associations represent a phenomenological response to the imputation of a negative essence through categorical identifications. The tenet that social change results from the interplay of structural and meaning components of social order (Smucker and Zijderveld, 1970) is a characteristic of the existence of these associations. Stigma is a result of the negative interplay of these two elements. Hawkins and Tiedemann indicate that the process of deviant identification involves

. . . (a) viewing a behavior (visibility), (b) recognizing it as deviant, which entails (c) the process of applying typifications of deviance to particular acts, (d) the attribute of intent to the actor. . . (e) a decision on the transgressors true nature--is he essentially deviant? (1975: 75).

The interplay of (c) and (e), shown above, may result in the identification and social existence of a we-union of a collective and categorical identification. This solidification of individuals into a collectivized and deviant identity leads to one of two perceived ontological states-of-being (Sagarin, 1969: 22-31). If a negative essence is imputed to the behavior by the we-union, the essential meaning espoused by the association will place the responsibility for the behavior on the individual.

A reinterpretation of responsibility which couches the source of deviance in the socialization or other processes--i.e., economic or political--and its accompanying universe of meaning will lead to belief in the alienated characteristics of situational imputations based on typifications of deviance. These refuted imputations by the associations may be based on perceived social typifications which are evident through anticipated behavioral expectations.

The examination of the subuniverse of meaning embodied in these categorical identifications involves the analysis of a weltanschauung which mediates, in a Mannheimian sense, the interpretation of the social settings to content of thought. The study of ideology employed by Mannheim, however, does not allow "reliance on the face value of what an adversary professes" (Farberman, 1970: 3-4). Mannheim clearly could not account for the existence of a we-union except through a form of "conspiratorial theory." His treatment of man as a "collectivistic agency" (Farberman, 1970: 6) whose "thought products are socio-existentially determined in form and content" (Remmling, 1971: 533) does not account for man as an interpersonal and innovative agent (Farberman, 1970: 6). Mannheim does not take into account the possibility that ideologies may be presented as embodiments of a group's phenomenologically perceived nature.

Gramsci, on the other hand, identifies the central question in the relationship of social reality to modern social theory and its historical approach in the following manner.

Can modern social theory be in opposition to the "spontaneous" feelings of the masses? ("Spontaneous" in the sense that they are not the result of any systematic educational activity or the product of an already conscious leading group, but have been formed through everyday experience illuminated by "commonsense"). . . It cannot be in opposition to them. Between the two there is a "quantitative" difference of degree, not one of quality. A reciprocal "reduction" so to speak, a passage from one to the other and vice versa, must be possible (1972: 199).

To carry out a phenomenological examination of ideology and its accompanying ontological relevance, Gramsci's focus upon "subaltern classes" and their accompanying organic intellectuals must be utilized within a Marxian sociology of knowledge. These subaltern classes are formal representations of subuniverses of meaning

which identify deviance as a result of cultural or socio-structural factors. In the former, the relation between the individual and the community undergoes reification since the individual is abstracted from the intersubjective context of association. In the latter, the relation of the individual to the community reflects a processural and intersubjective dependency that is projected in phantasied social praxis. Additionally, the orientation towards social change for these relations may be conjunctural or organic.

Conjunctural relations promulgate institutional referents as the determining source of the alienated power. Organic phenomena specify "systemic sources" of alienated power. Conjunctural, organic, and reified subaltern classes, therefore, retain their definitional status through interpretative relevance structures which define the relation of the community to outside social structure. Intersubjective "we-unions" then may be heuristically divided into types which reflect varying "idealized" relations between the community and outside sources of imposition. These idealized relations, however, also represent orientations towards change which reflect various modalities of phantasied social praxis. The consolidation of these modes of social praxis, however, is contingent upon these subaltern classes' ability to produce organic intellectuals who must be distinguished from traditional intellectuals. Gramsci divided intellectuals into two groups according to the function they serve in society.

In the first place there are the "traditional" professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the "organic" intellectuals, the thinking and

organizing element of a particular fundamental social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their profession. . . than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong (1972: 3).

This identification of the function of intellectuals makes evident the professional intellectual's dependency upon the social structure. Therefore, the task of professional intellectuals within a Marxian sociology of knowledge must assume a mediating nature for the organic intellectual who represents subaltern groups.

The professional intellectual must relate to the subaltern group as a system of relevance structures rather than assuming it to be a product of subjective intentionality. Following a methodological program of this sort will enable the investigator to appreciate the social philosophy inherent to Gramsci's work. For Gramsci, philosophy as intellectual order relates to and supercedes common sense as criticism and "in this sense it coincides with 'good' as opposed to 'common' sense" (1972: 325-326). It appears that whereas "common sense identifies the exact cause, simple and to hand, and does not let itself be distracted by fancy quibbles and psuedo-profound, psuedo-scientific metaphysical mumbo-jumbo," philosophy points to the revelation of the "good" based upon a coherent view of historical reality (Gramsci, 1972: 348). This relation between the "statics" of common sense and the critical, dynamic function of philosophy is a dialectical one in which common sense is guided by "good sense" of organic origin (Gramsci, 1972: 330). Gramsci indicates that any attempt by a subordinate group to achieve dominance depends upon the formation of organic intellectuals who are products of the commonsensical problems of the specific group.



One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals (1972: 10).

The intersubjective we-union serves as a practical referent for the gap between idealist philosophy and everyday, practico-activity through social praxis. The form of social praxis will depend upon the definition of the socio-political deviance promulgated by the group through its ideological topical relevance. Weigert indicates that "types of social action impose topical relevances which focus the attention of actors" (1975: 92).

The relation of the we-union to the "outside" society is delineated through the implementation of interpretative relevances which represent "a learned process of organizing past experiences for present action" (Weigert, 1975: 93). These two systems of relevance (topical and interpretative) depend upon motivational relevances for the explanation of social action. However, in the study of ideological manifestations within a subuniverse of meaning we are interested in the collectivized presentation of the essential self. For this reason, a delineation of the motivational relevance systems of a group is seemingly impractical if not impossible since these relevances depend upon individual and situational decisions to act. The structuring of motivational relevances represents a domain of investigation for ethnomethodology. The specific relevance of this assertion will be discussed in the conclusions of the thesis.

On the level of ideology, the topical relevance of a group refers to the collective definition of the deviant condition which involves a value orientation that

may be positive, negative, or neutral. Interpretative relevances, on the other hand, refer to the manner in which this relationship of the group towards macro-structural arrangements is explained.

The delineation of the ideological structure of varying associations representing deviant phenomena, therefore, must account for the intersubjective aspects of a subuniverse of meaning as well as the relation of the particular association towards components of other ideological positions.

It follows that the particularistic ideology is placed in a position which allows it to gain ontological significance from its adherents and leads to the possibility for replacement of the essential meaning ascribed by the total ideology--generally defined as irrelevant--by an alternative meaning which becomes "totalized."

#### Summary

This chapter has contrasted Mannheim's "objectivistic" orientation towards knowledge products to Gramsci's humanistic perspective towards voluntaristic action. The orientation of Gramsci has been shown to be of more utility in the investigation of a subuniverse of meaning. Gramsci's emphasis on the implementation of organic intellectual's thought products for the constitution of social theory enables the investigation to gain a reflexive orientation towards the structure of ideological manifestations. This reflexive quality is phenomenologically grounded in the relevance systems which voluntary associations proffer as the subuniverse of meaning for a particular identity. Therefore, the sociologist is capable of remaining sensitive to the various forms of reconstitution which may occur following the dereification of a particular identity.

The reconstitution of meaning for a stigmatized identity may remain on and become reified in the intersubjective level. It may be legitimated to the public, however, through a phenomenological commitment to social praxis. This process places it in a processural and humanistic orientation to social change.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sagarin (1969: 39) divides voluntary associations into expressive and instrumental types which parallel these two relevance orientations.

<sup>2</sup> The "methodological" components of the sociology of knowledge of Karl Mannheim (total and particularistic ideologies) are discussed below.

<sup>3</sup> Although deviant groups may not be considered proletarian in an orthodox Marxian sense and may be more reflective of Marx's lumpenproletariat, the conflict generated by an attempt to transform perceived structural determinants of reality may lead to an ideological identification with other groups of a proletarian nature (see Taylor, 1973: 23-24) (Gramsci, 1972: 204-205).

<sup>4</sup> Wolfe, in referring to the relationship of a Marxist theory of the state to the concept of "alienated power" (an inherent characteristic of a "we-union") suggests that

one of the first tasks of a Marxist theory of the state must. . . be the assertion of the primacy of neither (base/superstructure); only that of the empirical reality of the capitalist state must be asserted. To understand it means not fitting it into pre-established categories but modifying the categories to explain it. To do otherwise is to reify and mystify Marxism, hence to render it conservative, and thereby destroy its potentiality (1974: 138).

<sup>5</sup> Gramsci considered the formation of an "organic" state as a result of human efforts to transform the existing power structure with the accompanying reality through the "cultural" unification of the masses. However, this unification was considered a result of human praxis through which groups united to define the source of existential problems and move toward their reconciliation.

This serves to focus attention upon groups of lumpenproletariat as well as proletarian groups which struggle to overcome "subjectively" defined problems (see Taylor, 1973; and Horowitz, et. al., 1968).

Socialist revolutions have failed and will continue to fail, Gramsci contends, as long as the subjective components of Marxist theory are deficient. In other words, proletarian revolution is not the result of the immaturity of the working class and the nonripeness of the objective conditions, rather it is the result of a lack of subjective realization of the ripeness of objective conditions for socialist transformation. It is precisely the insistence on such subjective components of Marxism that differentiates Gramsci from Lenin (Salamini, 1974: 363).



<sup>6</sup>Totalization processes involve the production of a metaphysical framework in which language serves as a base and "functions as a continuous determinant of the perceptual-conceptual processes and the weltanschauung of the members of the language community" (Hertzler, 1966: 175).

### CHAPTER III

#### THE SUBSTRUCTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY

Homosexuality is analyzed within this chapter as a specific manifestation of a subuniverse of meaning which cannot be reduced to either psychologistic or biologicistic determinism. A critique of psycho-analysis and theories of biological etiology is given which concentrates upon these approaches' tendency towards abstracting the individual from the contextual dimension of social action. Subsequently, a more promising approach is proffered which concentrates its analysis upon homosexuality as a phenomena which may be acquired not only from childhood socialization but, also, as an outcome of adult socialization through ideological primary groups. These groups represent a negotiable dimension of order which functions as an internal structuring mechanism for the voluntary association. Thus, homosexuality can be fruitfully explored within a Marxian sociology of knowledge through an investigation of the themes of relevance constituted by a collective-presentation-of-self.

#### Homosexuality

West (1967) has shown that homosexuals usually do not conceive of the possibility for changing their propensity toward specific sexual objects of a homosexual nature to those of a heterosexual nature. This view concentrates upon homosexuality as a state-of-being (Hooker, 1965). Sagarin, however, views this as a reification of identity.

There is no such thing as a homosexual, for such a concept is a reification, an artificially created entity that has no basis in reality. . . The desires constitute feeling, the acts constitute doing, but neither is being (1973: 10).

The literature concerning the homosexual and homosexuality abounds with contradictions ideologically bound to their advocates. However, before entering into a discussion of the basic disagreements in the field concerning homosexuality and its effect on individuals, the phenomena must be nominatively defined. A definition of homosexuality will of necessity contain two basic elements. These are best drawn from Acosta.

On the one hand, some authors. . . consider individuals to be homosexual if they so identify themselves and if their sexual desires and overt sexual behavior are both predominantly directed to members of the same sex. On the other hand, some. . . consider a dominant fantasy or sexual desire for members of the same sex as evidence of homosexuality without the requirement of overt sexual behavior (1975: 10).

Utilizing this definition the relation of the two theoretical elements contained in, or conceptualized as, an identity and sustained through typified interaction among significant others claiming a similar definition may be delimited. The second component of Acosta's formulation allows for the existence of "secret deviance." In relation to identity the notion of "latency" leads to belief in a reified state-of-being--i.e., constitutional homosexuality.

The concept of secondary deviation as an ideal type is contained in Acosta's definition since there is typified behavior and being a latent deviant possibly becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the homosexual is nominatively defined as an individual whose sexual orientation is predominantly directed toward members of the same sex and who believes this activity to be an essential indication

of sexual identity. This definition does not reify the individual's identity since the behavioral component is related to the identificational component which involves the guidance of situationally enacted behavior.

This "guidance" is related theoretically to Shutz's emphasis on "relevances" and the various dimensions of the "problem of relevance" in relation to existential experience. Shutz's discussion of the process through which action obtains meaning makes evident a circular or dialectical relation among the motivational, interpretational, and topical relevances which he construes as either "imposed" or "intrinsic" to consequent action (Weigert, 1975: 94). Shutz (1970) does not account for the reaction of the individual through the production of "intrinsic relevances" since an excursion into this question would involve a positivistic methodology or "psychological" reductionism. However, this should not by necessity be considered a detraction from his theoretical development since the cognitive and historical "possibilities" of action are open to inquiry. That is, the sociological investigator can attempt to group phenomenologically the "systems of motivational relevance which determine and define one's interests" (Weigert, 1975: 94). Cotton presents an example of this aspect of the homosexual milieu.

In heterosexual society the two sexes automatically provide many status distinctions by which to arrange peer-group, sexual and marital relationships. Since homosexuals operate primarily in a one-gender milieu, there does not exist such a natural means of making status distinctions. . . Deviant groups attempt to set up value systems and status distinctions parallel to those in the larger society (1972: 322).

From a more radical stance, Milligan argues that

when homosexuals do "marry" each other they unwittingly turn marriage into a charade. Gay marriages performed by the



Metropolitan Community Church in the U.S.A. are a grisly parody of heterosexual ceremonies. Far from making homosexuality acceptable, they demonstrate the absurdity of marriage and challenge the assumptions that the institution rests upon (1973: 3).

Thus, the interaction of homosexuals within their community is patterned and typified through an outward manifestation which may reflect structural qualities of the heterosexual world. This characteristic element of the interaction among homosexuals is considered for the purposes of this thesis as an "identificational" or expressive element of the homosexual phenomena. These expressive characteristics of a subuniverse of meaning function as mechanisms of internal legitimation and constitute a hegemonic device.

The implementation of systems of relevance which serve to legitimize identity through "parallel" forms of symbolic action are representations of "imposed relevances" which function as guides for interaction. These imposed relevances may be of a reified nature, or they may be manifestations of processural orientations toward reality transformation as a "human" enterprise. A reified imposed relevance leads to a deviant identification which is the result of cultural processes and as such is not related to a commitment to social change. An emphasis on the human dimension of the process of deviance creation, however, is reflected in the suggestion that specific socio-structural phenomena act as the source of imposition. In order to clarify this distinction, it is necessary to discuss the predominant orientations used in the investigation of homosexuality. Upon close examination, it is evident that these approaches have theoretically "abstracted" the homosexual individual from the social-milieu wherein the experiential nature of his or her homosexuality emerged.

### Psycho-Analytic Theory

Among the most influential theoretical orientations to homosexuality has been the psycho-analytic approach. This orientation has traditionally stressed deficient parent-child relationships as the early source of homosexuality in both males and females (Acosta, 1975: 14). The major weakness of this approach lies in the general inadequacy of the testability of psycho-analytic assumptions. For example, Bieber, et. al., (1962) found that mothers of homosexuals, in accord with psycho-analytic hypotheses, are often seductive and intimate while the individual's father is usually hostile and detached. However, Plummer has argued that

several studies have demonstrated how easy it is to plunge a knife right into the heart of most homosexual research (Bieber notwithstanding) on methodological grounds (1975: 123).

In reference to the epistemological nature of psychoanalysis, Shutz indicates that the assumption behind the approach is akin to the conception of "smaller perception" in Leibniz's philosophy. Smaller perceptions are phenomena which can never be apperceived but exist instead in an unidentifiable relation to other phenomenon.

The content of what Freud calls subconscious life, however, can be virtually thematized, and the analytic technique consists first in bringing the hidden motive of the neurotic behavior into the horizontal field of consciousness, and finally making it its thematic kernel. To the patient, his neurotic behavior with its undisclosed motive is the theme related to an outer level of his personality. The hidden counterpart in a deeper level of his personality is theoretically concerned with what psycho-analytical terminology has baptized the "subconscious motive" of such behavior (1970: 13).

Psycho-analytic theory allows the individual to "freely associate" through the oscillation of the thematic field at random from one level of the personality to another (Schutz, 1970: 15). The theoretical base of this approach is constructed

through the relation of an ideal-typical or reified state-of-being which serves to thematize at the most extreme level the "good" and the "evil" (desirable and undesirable). The manifestation of a sense of neurosis (stigma or feeling of rejection) is an act of faith on the individual's part since the value necessitating the rejection depends upon imputations from others. Berger (1965) has likened the psycho-analytic role to that of a modern-day priest. Following from this observation it does not appear surprising that "it seems [that] almost any combination of family factors has been shown at some time to have aetiological links" to homosexual proclivities and homosexuality (Plummer, 1975: 125).

#### Biological Etiology

In addition to the psycho-analytic approach for explanation of the etiology of homosexuality there has been interest in biological factors as they may influence homosexual behavior. The assumption underlying Kinsey's (1948) widely acclaimed study was that homosexual conduct is a biological variant; and, thus, it conferred a normative nature to the homosexual (Socarides, 1975: 115). The interpretation of the Kinsey Report as a measure of homosexuality and homosexual behavior has been questioned by several investigators, who, in turn, have been criticized by others. Karlen (1971) points out the positive qualities of the Kinsey statistics, yet Sagarin suggests that

with all his reading, there is no sign that Karlen ever examined the report (largely though not entirely favorable) of Kinsey's volume on males made by a special committee of the American Statistical Association (1973: 9).

Tripp (1975: 233-235) refers to critics of the report--specifically the American Statistical Association--as instigating action against the Kinsey Report

because of moral bias. This, according to Tripp, was reflected in a conspiracy to discredit the report and its statistics.

Paul Gabbard, the head of the Institute for Sex Research, has acknowledged that "distortion may have arisen from the large number of prisoners who had been part of the sample" particularly in the grade 8 through 12 educational level (Kinsey, 1948: 3). A basic criticism of Kinsey's work, which established the idea of an existing "heterosexual-homosexual" continuum, is presented by Bergler, who indicates that Kinsey "takes his human guinea pigs [volunteers] for idealists who volunteered only for the purpose of furthering scientific research [and] that the chief appeal [for this volunteering] has been altruistic." (1969: 272).

The ultimate validity of Kinsey and his colleagues' assumptions and their methodological procedures are not of primary importance here. The importance of the Kinsey Report for this thesis lies in its social-psychological impact and its use as a device for legitimation of homosexual behavior. However, one important shortcoming of the theoretical approach of the Kinsey Report should be mentioned. Kardiner (1954) expresses this concern well.

Dr. Kinsey's procedure would be quite valid if he were studying variations in the anatomical structure of ants. Statistics here would show variations in biological make-up. In the study of sexual behavior, however, statistical variations are only one small part of the total study on the basis of which one could venture an interpretation. The chief reason for this is that sexual behavior is predominantly a motivated field (cited in Socarides, 1975: 114).

In his review of the various etiological orientations toward homosexuality Acosta indicates that "some genetic, chromosomal, or hormonal factors may function to some degree in the onset of homosexual behavior" (1975: 13). Acosta notes,

however, that there has been no substantial evidence established to support this contention. At the time of this writing, a biological explanation seems inadequate for providing a full explanation of homosexuality.

### Social-Psychological Explanations

The social learning approach to the explanation of homosexual activity holds that "psycho-analytic explanations may account for the development of homosexuality in a minority of homosexuals but not the majority" (Plummer, 1975: 17). This psycho-analytic theoretical orientation has been generally considered relevant when attention is directed toward childhood experiences and the relationship of these experiences to the formation of the self-concept (Plummer, 1975: 131).

Plummer (1975: 130-131) advances a more voluntaristic approach to the study of homosexuality. He views the sexual role as an ever-changing perceptual phenomena in constant transformation and interpretation. Although a connection between early childhood experiences and homosexuality may be inferred, adult socialization into sexual roles is also important. The approach presented by Plummer does not separate the manifestation of homosexual activity from its surrounding environment. Rates of homosexuality as well as attendant meanings became the focusing orientations of this approach when adult as well as childhood processes of socialization and meaning internalization is emphasized. The individual's commitment to the deviant role and the interrelation of this sense of commitment to outside structures thus become important.

Following from the concern with the influence of social structures upon homosexual behavior and homosexuality, Ashworth and Walker present a theoretical



orientation to patterns of homosexual behavior which takes as its focus the "significance of social structural considerations for the understanding of homosexuality" (1972: 146). This involves the question of a "symmetry of accessibility between genders" (Plummer, 1975: 128) and the role of social structures in the obstruction of symmetrical accessibility (Ashworth and Walker, 1972: 148). From this theoretical orientation, structural elements from the outside society as well as elements of differentiation and problematic identification are important for the stabilization of sexual identity in either a conventional or a deviant pattern. Thus, the deviant subuniverse of meaning can militate against access to erotic heterosexual gratification through an hegemony of meanings embodied in a substructure. Sagarin argues that

within the homophile organizations, members sneer at anyone who expresses an interest in changing. They remark pessimistically that such a person will soon be back in the fold (1969: 105).

Therefore, voluntary associations present structural impositions of meaning to the individual member in relation to his or her sexual identity. Members of voluntary associations of homosexuals, however, cannot be considered "average" homosexuals since the investigator does not know what percentage of the total homosexual population they represent. This methodological problem is a direct result of the phenomena of secret deviance. Several comparisons, however, may be drawn concerning public homosexuality and private or secret homosexuals.

Harry's study of urbanization and homosexuality which concentrated on the gay bar attempts to show the interrelation between a public institution and secret homosexuals. His study represents the first source of data on a national scale for

an institution supporting homosexual activity (Harry, 1974: 238). The representativeness of the clients of gay bars with regard to the homosexual population has been an object of dispute among researchers in the area of homosexuality. Hooker (1965) contends that clients of gay bars represent a small minority of the homosexual population with non-bar-going homosexuals finding satisfaction in more personal kinds of interaction. Weinberg (1970: 319), however, suggests that bar-going homosexuals constitute a substantial portion of the total homosexual population. Harry accounts for the possibility of the gay-bar as a centralizing institution of the homosexual community by showing that gay bars tend to be differentiated into types which have distinctive characteristics:

. . . Bars catering to the younger gays are much more common than those catering to older gays. Presumably, the reasons for this are due to the older gay's reduced frequency of bar attendance . . . The greater rarity of Older than Younger gay bars may be also partly due to the tendency of the older gay to more widely distribute his bar attendance among a variety of bar types including Young gay bars. Thus, as the gay ages, he may diversify his lifestyle activities (1974: 244).

This debate centers on the symbolic attributes of the gay-bar and its relation to the homosexual community. If the patrons of the bar are typical homosexuals, then the stratification revealed by Harry might reflect some structural characteristics of the homosexual community. However, if the bar patrons and members of homosexual organizations are not representative of the homosexual population, investigators of the invisible side of the homosexual world may be engaged in a fruitless search. For example, Cotton has shown that many homosexuals exist in small, tight, social units which replace the "gay-bar"; but, interestingly, their "friends" seldom have sex with a member of the clique. He provides an illustration.

You just don't have sex with your friends, that's all. If you have someone who is a lover, of course you introduce him to your friends, and take him to parties, etc. But if he starts to get into the group, somehow you seem to lose interest (1972: 317).

Whereas, one might argue that the older and more settled homosexual lifestyle and sexual orientation is not found among homosexuals who seek attention from psychiatrists and other therapists, Cotton depicts these older homosexuals' relationships as primarily being based upon companionship designed for mutual economic support. The world of the secret homosexual revolves around tight-knit cohesive groups of friends characterized by Cotton as "disillusioned about ever being able to maintain [a] permanent relationship, much less [to be able] to set up living arrangements with a lover" (1972: 313). These tight-knit groups of friends among secret homosexuals appear to be related to a phenomena categorized by Marx and Holzner as "ideological primary groups." Ideological primary groups, assert Marx and Holzner, "are informal, unstructured collectivities sufficiently small for members to have direct, face-to-face relations and for each member to have an opportunity to participate at every meeting" (1975: 316). These groups give individuals an opportunity to meet in order to share common experiences which lead to primary group solidarity. The nature of the study of such groups or gatherings in the homosexual community necessitates a grounding in ethnographic epistemology since membership and problem solving through the exchange of experiences is constantly changing. Marx and Holzner suggest that the central notion in the ideological primary group's development is usually a shared sense of injustice (1975: 316).

However, ideological primary groups represent only the intersubjective realm of the deviant group. The ideological primary group, in this sense, constitutes

a "purely" expressive orientation to the category of injustice (i.e., homosexual stigma or oppression). A logical extension of this idea is the notion that these ideological primary groups serve as a focus for significant others. In turn, this interaction might lead to and continually facilitate identification with established groups or voluntary associations of homosexuals with a formulated ideology. An example of a "pure" expressive association is the voluntary association of homosexuals known as Christopher Street West Association. As their chairperson indicates:

Our organization has one primary function and that is to put on a parade and/or carnival once a year. While we do meet twelve months out of the year to plan for this event and to keep ourselves up on current political activities which directly affect the Gay Community, we do not put out a newsletter. Most of our members are involved in other groups/organizations and keep us up to date (Personal Communication: March 15, 1976).

The interrelation of life-styles among confirmed homosexuals is described by Cotton as a counter-culture (1972: 311). He goes on to suggest that

deviant groups attempt to set up value systems and status distinctions parallel to those in the larger society. When for a particular reason it is impossible to follow the example of the dominant society in detail, a new form or procedure or value system, serving a specific need, will emerge based on possible criteria (1972: 322).

It is at this point that Cotton closes off his analysis. His frame of reference is insufficient for an analysis of a counter-culture or of the production of alternative institutions as addressed in this thesis. Cotton's analysis deals only with the imposition of the expectations taken from the outside society and can be compared to the earlier notion of subculture formulated by Cohen (1955). The legitimations constructed by these subcultures is interpreted as pre-determined from values embodied in the outside culture. Cotton does not consider the possibility of qualitative dereification

through the production of phenomenologically, organic intellectuals within the homosexual community.

Sagarin emphasizes a more general view of voluntary associations and argues that the fundamental purpose of these associations is one of proselytization. He also asserts that this "nature" will bring defeat to the homophile movement.

As it's constituted now, it must continue at war both with itself and the world of science, its ideology has led it into a cul de sac where, despite itself, it has become a proselytizer for sexual deviation. As such, the homophile movement cannot be successful in reorienting the public's attitude toward, or its image of, the homosexual in society (1969: 110).

The question of whether voluntary associations representing homosexuality act as proselytizing agents is difficult to address due to secret homosexuality's category, which must be addressed in any study of homosexuality. However, a possible solution to this problem may be found in a phenomenological approach to the concept of commitment and the notion of the ideological primary group. Stanage indicates that a

person is committing himself whenever he projects himself through choices, and this gives himself over to something or to someone even when none of this is uttered or covert behavior. A man commits himself whenever his very character is said to be given over to something or to someone else. A person's commitment begins even at the point where he becomes conscious of a situation involving the necessity for him to choose, whatever his overt course of action might be eventually (1970: 34-35).

The concept of commitment when applied to the ideological manifestation of voluntary associations yields an explanation for the divergence of particular associations from parallel institutional manifestations as they relate to "outside" phenomena.

As noted above, the analysis of Cotton (1972) fails to account for the institutional structures of the homosexual "counter-culture" which diverge from the



systems of legitimation of sexual identity for the "outside" society. He presents no theoretical explanation for a group finding it "impossible to follow the example of the dominant society" (1972: 322). He overlooks the phenomenological possibility that an individual may develop an essential perception of self which serves to confer authenticity to certain topical phenomena and interpretative relevances. This orientation to the homosexual community supports Sagarin's argument which essentially placed all organizations of deviants in a proselytizing role. However, if the relation of the ideological primary group to the voluntary association is examined analytically, rather than psychologically, the relations of the individual components of the sub-universe may be methodologically explored. Although the research strategies of ethnomethodology are not employed in this thesis, an analytical approach to ideology which retains the possibility for the utilization of ethnomethodology's focus upon negotiation as the structuring mechanism for social order is utilized. Antecedent to this, the relation of the ideological primary group to the voluntary association must be systematically explored.

#### The Ideological Primary Group and Voluntary Associations

In the concluding remarks of his work, Odd Man In, Sagarin provides an account of the relationship of voluntary associations of deviants to the ideological presentation of the collective-self which these associations proffer toward the "outside" society. He indicates that

deviants, particularly those who are victims without being victimizers, have found in sociologists a group anxious to express their friendship and understanding.

It is not expected, then, that internecine battles for power and strong arm methods involving threats and even blackmail should have

been concealed from public view. Every organization projects an image that it wishes the world to accept. . . The history of the group is carefully concealed, ideological distortion is glossed over, and successes exaggerated (1969: 234).

Similarly, in an earlier work Sagarin argues that "since an individual deviant may have a way of life totally inconsistent with the image being projected, this projection, rather than alleviate his inner conflicts and offer him self-support, may very well make him feel unworthy even of the standards within the deviant group" (1968: 93). Sagarin's orientation toward the collective-presentation-of-self for voluntary associations of deviants assumes a consensus among ideological participants within the association. Yet the conflictual basis of the ideological presentation-of-self simply becomes a topic for further research. Therefore, the ideological themes formally put forth by the association must be considered as products of a process of negotiation. Through this process of negotiation the "ideals" of the group become thematized as "phantasied orientations" toward legitimate social praxis for the collective-self.

Sagarin (1968; 1969) does not approach the conflict of groups within the voluntary association in an analytical mode of conceptualization and thereby fails to acknowledge the possibility that a collective-presentation-of-self might be authentic to the individual member, even though the individual may not agree with the idealization that the association projects. Under close scrutiny, however, the relation of the ideological primary group to the voluntary association of deviants demonstrates the possibility of an "authentic" presentation of the collective-self which legitimates the particular ideal of pressing for a transformation in structural arrangements. The possibility of this authenticity lies in discursive validation of the voluntary association's ideological presentation. That is, the investigator must

be aware and render accountable the varying ideological primary groups within the symbolic structures of the voluntary association which he or she desires to explore. The researcher must explore the hegemonic nature of the expressive functions for an association which serve to "convert" individuals to the consciousness of a we-union with the ideological primary group. Thus, the ideological primary group may serve as a referential agent for the more formal voluntary association. An orientation of this sort fails to include a consideration of the expansion of membership as a result of proselytization. Instead, the researcher should more appropriately approach the conversion process as an actual form of a situational process of negotiation through which individuals consider the "relevance" of the ideological primary group's symbolic reality for the resolution of his or her private-personal troubles. This procedure is not possible within a thematic examination of ideological structure. Therefore, voluntary associations are herein heuristically divided through the Marxian nature of the association. Drawing upon the work of Gramsci (1972), the balance of this thesis will address the phenomenological commitment of the association and its relationship to the "phantasied" orientation of the association toward social change as reified, conjunctural, or organic. A systemic orientation to the phenomenological dimensions of these realities is attempted in the following chapter with a thematic analysis of publications which reflect the association's collective-self.

#### Summary

This chapter has addressed a number of conceptual inadequacies in the dominant theoretical orientations to homosexuality. The assumption of the symbolic

interactionist tradition--that humans are born with a sexual drive which may be directed through internalized meanings--is considered to hold adequate explanatory power for the purposes of this research.

The influence of ideological primary groups on adult socialization and the identification of individuals with more structural forms of ideological presentation (voluntary associations) herein is considered to be a theoretical area which may appropriately be subjected to an ethnomethodological approach. A presentation of the more structural components of the homosexual reality, however, is also useful for a Marxian sociology of knowledge since the legitimate possibilities for social praxis by the we-union may be delineated. This delineation is phenomenological and thus places emphasis on the immanent meanings put forth by voluntary associations in relationship to social change.

CHAPTER IV  
COLLECTIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF IDEOLOGY:  
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Voluntary associations link the categorical phenomena of homosexuality to society and thereby establish legitimate possibilities for social praxis within each hegemonic substructure. The hegemonic force of a particular weltanschauung establishes the symbolic parameters of the social change desired by the collective we-union and, therefore, "totalizes" the legitimate commitment of the association. This chapter specifies a categorical framework for a phenomenological analysis of such purposive collective-presentations-of-self as they appear in "official" literature collected from 24 voluntary associations of homosexuals.

The purpose here is to acquaint the reader with the justifications employed for the categorization of the various phenomenological components within categorically identified weltanschauungen. These justifications are more structurally apparent through an identification of the categorical placements and also through a presentation of essential, thematic statements within the literature. These statements clarify the distinction between weltanschauungen which operate within the collective legitimation of homosexuality. Subsequently, a referent typology is constructed which serves as an ideological map of the substructure of legitimation within the subuniverse of homosexuality.



Phenomenological Analysis: A Categorical Method

An explication of the collective-presentation-of-self for each association necessitates an analysis of their literature which focuses upon three specific areas of importance in the delineation of ideological structure. These ideological components are (1) the topical relevance (value orientation) of the association, (2) the various interpretative relevances (ideals) presented by the association, and (3) the phenomenological commitment of the association to social change.

The topical relevance presented by an association directs the attention of potential actors (Weigert, 1975: 92) and makes possible a clarification of the value orientation promulgated by the association with regard to the deviant category (see Schutz, 1970: 71). Thus, the phenomena is viewed positively, negatively, or its relevance to existence may be questioned.

The interpretative relevances presented by the association "enable the actor to understand topically problematic objects" (Weigert, 1975: 93). Since "there is no such thing as a type as such" (the outcome of formerly valid systems of interpretative relevances) "but only types related to particular problems" (Schutz, 1970: 63), these interpretative relevances relate the specific value orientation (topical relevance) of the categorical phenomena to "outside" phenomena. The interpretative relevances also provide a foundation for possible rationalization of the social reality manifested in homosexual activities to consociates of the "we-union" (see Speigelberg, 1973). Speigelberg indicates that

in itself the mere address does not lead to any change in the person addressed. However, such a change does occur as soon as he pays attention to this appeal. It is his turning face, his focusing on the speaker [organic intellectual] as his spokesman, which the address aims to bring about (1973: 133-134).

The following analysis concentrates on each association as a semi-autonomous unit and delineates the relevance systems manifested by each unit along with the degree of phenomenological commitment to those systems of relevance. The research is oriented toward two components of the substructure of homosexuality. These components are found in the ideological modality of the association as they exist in relation to a phenomenological commitment to social change (radical, liberal, or conservative) and the Marxian nature of the association in the relation of the individual to the collective-identity (reified, conjunctual, organic). Methodologically, this analysis constitutes a subjective endeavor through which the framework of research may be communicated; however, the essential process remains preconceptually thematic and, therefore, intuitive in nature. Contrary to an "objectivist" approach toward knowledge classification, phenomenological analysis identifies emergent rather than historical meanings of ideological phenomenon (see Piccone, 1971). These immanent meanings are actually moral judgments (topical relevances) and their accounts (interpretative relevances). Even though these moral statements with their explanatory accounts only retain validity within the context in which the act relates to the individual world (Rock, 1972: 142), the categorical identifications attached to these judgments are social constructions made manifest through an ideological structure. The categories of (1) Marxian nature and (2) phenomenological commitment, therefore, are open for examination.

#### The Identification of Ideological Modalities

The classification of each association as conservative, liberal, or radical is contingent upon the topical and interpretative relevances and their relationship to

the phenomenological commitment to social change. The various dimensions of the topical relevances have been addressed above.

Following Stanage (1970) the phenomenological commitment of each association is divided into (1) consensive, (2) intensitive, and (3) active dimensions of commitment. "Commitment is defined as. . . the overt activity of. . . expressing commissive language in some degree and at some level, i.e., consensive language, intensitive language, and/or active language" (38). Stanage presents examples of sentences expressing intensitive and active language in organizations of the radical right.

The statement of goals, purposes, programs, etc., of the patriotic clubs. . . are often couched in what has been called intensitive and active language. . . Witness the John Birch Society's signs, "Support your local police" (intensitive) and "Impeach Earl Warren" (active) (1970: 40).

Thus, Stanage classifies commissive language into three distinct foci. These are utilized in this research to delineate the association's phenomenological commitment to legitimate social praxis for the collective-self. A consensive dimension of commitment is associated with conservatism, whereas the intensitive and active dimensions of phenomenological commitment respectively are categorized as liberal and radical.

#### The Specification of Marxian Nature

The Marxian nature of each association is specified through the essential identification of the we-union as it relates to other categorical phenomena and the possibilities for social change inherent in these identifications. The identification of the source of these possibilities reflects either a "reified" or a "processural" (conjunctural or organic) Marxian identity. The nature of a Marxian identity serves as a referent for the projected essence of the community with which the categorical

phenomena is identified. This community may be characterized as a manifestation of externalizing agents in which case it is specified within a processural category. On the other hand, the essential nature of community may be viewed as a mediating agent for an epiphenomenon in which case it is specified as reified. In this instance homosexuality is "totalized" whereas the processural categories (conjunctural, organic) represent homosexuality as an agent for historically emerging social change.

This distinction of identities is clearly of importance to a Marxian sociology of knowledge within a phenomenological analysis. The proletariat (as a "self-made" phenomena) specifies the relation between a precategorized "feeling" and a categorical identification which takes on "reflexive" characteristics. These reflexive characteristics are conveyed through an intersubjective reality which depends upon symbolic interaction and categorical identification (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 222). The processural identification suggests a categorical linkage of members with an ontology of human mediation.

#### The Presentation of Categorical Substructure

The identification of each substructural category (ideological modality and Marxian nature) depends upon an "essential" belief in the possibility and desirability of social praxis within the various levels of a categorical phenomena. The ideological modalities (conservative, liberal, radical) are identified in relation to the phenomenological structure of relevance for each association.

The radical modality is found only in those associations emphasizing a processural nature of community and an active (phenomenological commitment)-positive (topical relevance) structure of relevance. Historically, this modality has

appeared with a conjunctural or organic interpretative relevance which designates the role of each referent type in homosexual legitimation. The liberal modality appears exclusively with the processural Marxian nature and a conjunctural referent for legitimate social praxis. The conservative modality, on the other hand, appears in the categories for reified as well as processural Marxian nature of community. The consentive-positive relevance structure is present as a processural and a reified mediation for the individual and his accompanying "collective-self." The variation between these placements is a result of their respective presentations of that agent mediating the relation of the individual to the community. Consentive-positive relevance structures within the reified-conservative referent present the mediation as epiphenomenal, whereas consentive-positive relevance structures for the conjunctural-conservative referent present the mediation as a structural and interpersonal matter. The latter retains a symbolic human essence whereas the former presents the mediation as a purely spiritual epiphenomenon. The sub-structure of this referent typology represents the analytical components of a sub-universe of meaning. The possibilities of legitimate social praxis for the collective, however, must be viewed purely as projections.

#### Data Sources

To obtain a sample of associations from which to draw the appropriate data, the researcher consulted the Encyclopedia of Associations (1975) from which six initial voluntary associations of homosexuals were identified by title and address (see Appendix A). This formal connection to the population of voluntary associations of homosexuals seemed more desirable initially than a direct contact with one specific



association since the primary concern was for identifying a more structural mode of data collection.

Except for the radical-organic type, initial subject organizations were representative of the typological referent types specified below. The radical-organic referent, through which the identity of homosexuality becomes a mediating agent for a totalized "human" form (the proletariat), is not included in the Encyclopedia of Associations. The researcher was informed of the existence of these associations (Lavender and Red Union; and the Gay Caucus of the Youth Against War and Fascism) by a representative of the Gay Activists Alliance.

#### Data Collection

The six subject groups were first contacted by telephone. The purpose of proceeding in this manner stemmed both from the researcher's apprehension concerning contact with these associations and the need for sensitization to appropriate patterns of communication with homosexuals. The phone calls were also useful for the construction of a satisfactory contact letter (Appendix B) in which the request for literature from each association was made. The literature surveyed was in the form of newsletters, pamphlets, books, and other material published by the associations which focused on the homophile movement. The researcher was "sensitized" to appropriate protocol during the phone calls. For instance, when he mentioned the notion of a group ideology in an initial phone call, he was verbally reprimanded by a member of the Gay Activists Alliance of New York, who denied the possibility that his association might be in the business of proselytizing "deviants." The use of the term ideology as part of the description of the association's Weltanschauung was subsequently replaced by a more acceptable concept--"orientation."

During the initial contact with each group, a request was made for a designation of "from 5 to 10" organizations which the contact believed to be "important" to the homophile movement. After cross-referencing the list of organizations obtained from the initial six organizations, the researcher made contact with a total of thirty-two organizations (Appendix C). Some form of information was received from twenty-four of these groups. Due to financial resources and time limitations, the total list obtained from the associations could not be contacted. This problem might have been aggravated even more if the decision for "total" contact had been made since some of the associations did not name other groups.

Clearly, the representativeness of this sample when considering the total population of voluntary associations of homosexuals is questionable. However, the general difficulty in obtaining material from each group was magnified by the average length of time (over two months) for reply after the initial contact. This difficulty resulted in a four-month data collection period. As a result, we were unable to sample past the second stage of reference.

The data available to the researcher is adequate, however, since the purpose for constructing the typology was heuristic. Modal orientations toward social praxis were identified for all three degrees of phenomenological commitment, and instances of Marxian nature were specified within the three possible dimensions. Obviously, any attempt to proffer "definitive propositions" necessitate a larger sample.

#### Typology Construction

The construction of the typology for representation of the deviant substructure within the category of homosexual identification involved an in-depth review of the

literature obtained from the various associations. After the exclusion of non-relevant groups, nineteen associations were subjected to the phenomenological analysis described above. This examination was consolidated within the descriptive typology as shown in Table 1. Within the typology eight modal positions were identified between the association's phenomenological commitment toward social change (consentive, intensive, active) with its accompanying topical relevance, as well as the Marxian nature of the association (nature of the ideals).

The following discussion presents the data first as an ideal-typical referent of the ideological modality with the association's Marxian nature. Secondly, it is presented as a description of the "internal" and subjective structure for the particular associational weltanschauung.

#### Organic-Radical

This categorical referent identifies those we-unions which promote ideals for social praxis which emphasize the "total" liberation of oppressed people. The Lavender and Red Union gives insight to this relation through its publication, Come Out Fighting.

We struggle for an end to the exploitation of people for profit.  
And as Gay Liberationists, we feel a cultural and political identity  
with our people and work for our liberation (Come Out Fighting,  
No. 12 & 13: 2).

The internal phenomenological structure for this categorical referent (organic-radical) is identified through an active phenomenological commitment to social change and a positive orientation to the identification of the individual within a categorically "deviant" community.

TABLE 1

REFERENT TYPOLOGY AND CATEGORICAL PERCENTAGE OF  
SAMPLED VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS OF HOMOSEXUALS

Ideological Modality	Marxian Nature of Association		
	Reified	Conjunctural	Organic
Radical		Active-Positive 16.6%	Active-Positive 11.1%
Liberal		Intendive-Neutral 5.5%	
		Intendive-Positive 16.6%	
		Active-Neutral 5.5%	
Conservative	Consentive-Negative 5.5%	Consentive-Positive 11.1%	
	Consentive-Positive 27.7%		

N = 19

An instance of an active phenomenological commitment is found in the literature of the Gay Caucus of Youth Against War and Fascism.

It can be done, and to end our oppression, it must be done, but it will take all of us together, united and strong, to stop the U. S. death machine before it stops the world.

Fight Back to Smash Gay Oppression! (Y.A.W.F., The Struggle Against Sexual Oppression: no date).

The relation between the individual and the categorical identity is presented as positive within this referent (organic-radical). The positive qualities of this identification, however, are held to be contingent upon a positive identification for community with all "oppressed people."

The socialist revolution is a permanent revolution, one of continuous change. Along with many changes that need to be made in the socialist countries, the gay question is surely one of them. In the meantime, we ought to concentrate on preparing our own revolutions, in which the struggle for the liberation of all oppressed people, including gay people, is an indispensable condition for victory (McCuffin, 1976: 83).

The organic-radical referent therefore is retained through an active phenomenological commitment and a positive sense of identity with the "community" of oppressed peoples.

#### Conjunctural-Radical

The conjunctural-radical referent represents an identification field for particular we-unions which articulate ideals for liberation within the specific category of homosexuality. The following statement drawn from the Gay Activists Alliance exemplifies this stance.

G.A.A. seeks to draw gays together, whatever their differences on other questions, to struggle for the one thing that we all can agree on, one which assumes central importance for all of us: gay liberation (the Gay Activist, Dec.-Jan.; 1975: 2).



The conjunctural nature of the association is identified through the particularistic goals of categorical liberation. Internally, the phenomenological structure of this referent is interpreted as an active phenomenological commitment and a positive orientation toward the relation of the individual and the community of categorical deviants.

The active phenomenological commitment of this referent was identified through statements of commissive language within the literature. The following paragraphs taken from the National Gay Task Force's publication, It's Time, demonstrate this commitment.

In the December issue of It's Time, "Take Action" focused on letter-writing as one way of letting legislators know how much this bill is needed. This month's project involves setting up meetings with your congressperson (It's Time, January 1976: 3).

Write letters--Letters are important! Contrary to popular belief they are read, if not by the politician, then by one of his or her legislative aides (It's Time, December 1975: 3).

These organizations not only promote social action, but also present guidelines toward the implementation of these goals. A topical relevance expressing a positive, essential relation between the individual and the categorically deviant community is also apparent within this referent category. Specification of the positive value stance is drawn from the Mattachine Society of the Niagara Frontier.

If we wait until the dawn of realization or the age of sexual reasoning comes along, we'll wait forever. There are no mythological forces that "bring the light" to people's eyes. Any progress that's made, any revelations that are laid before us, are brought into being by a collective reaction on the part of those suffering injustices. . . To make this a reality, we need--Gay Visibility (Fifth Freedom, May-June, 1975: 7).

The very first person that should know you're gay is yourself. . . Gay is health, gay is good and it's Love the way you

want it--not the way someone else wants you to want it (Fifth Freedom, May-June, 1975: 7).

#### Organic-Radical/Conjunctural-Radical

The basic phenomenological difference between these referents is apparent when the ideals and essential identities of the we-unions are examined. While the organic-radical referent focuses upon the need for "totalization" of particularistic types through a universalistic human object of oppression (the proletariat) and stresses the need for unity among all oppressed peoples, the conjunctural-radical referent focuses upon the totalization of a particular categorical type of oppression (the homosexual). These ideals correspond to the essential identity of specific we-unions within each referent category. The essential identity for the organic-radical we-union is specified as proletarian through a particular type (homosexual), whereas the essential identity of the conjunctural-radical is totalized in the same particular type. Each retains possibilities for "legitimate" social change on distinct levels.

#### Conjunctural-Liberal

The conjunctural-liberal referent for the typology is composed of three cells which are not mutually exclusive since they share a common referential category. All three cells share the conjunctural-liberal referent for possibilities of social change and a phenomenological commitment to that referent. The structural differentiation of these three cells is identified within the relevances promulgated by the association and the phenomenological commitment of each.

The intensive-neutral substructural type for the conjunctural-liberal referent ideal-type posits a neutral topical relevance in regard to the relation of the individual

to the community. The Society for Individual Rights (S. I. R. ) indicates that it organizes for

. . . the reaffirming of individual pride and dignity regardless of orientation; the elimination of the public stigma attached to human self-expression. . . the creating of a sense of community; and the establishing of an attractive social atmosphere and constructive outlets for members and their friends (Constitution of S. I. R., Dec. 6, 1972).

The sense of community promulgated by S. I. R. is that of an internal associational community rather than a categorical community. Phenomenologically, however, the intensive commitment of the association to social change, manifest in commissive language, explains its placement within the conjunctural-liberal referent. S. I. R. presents an intensive phenomenological commitment to social change. In this regard, the stated purposes of organization include

. . . the accomplishing of effective changes in unjust laws concerning private relationships among consenting adults; and the giving of real and substantial aid to members in difficulties (Constitution of S. I. R., Dec. 6, 1972).

This "commitment" links this type of we-union to other we-unions of the referent ideal-type (conjunctural-liberal).

The intensive-positive substructural type may be characterized by a positive topical relevance with regard to the relation of the individual to the community. For instance, the stated goal of Gay People at Columbia-Barnard is

. . . to create a gay community at Columbia which will enable its members to relate to each other as persons in an unoppressive atmosphere (Constitution of Gay People at Columbia-Barnard: no date).

The intensive-positive cell also presents an intensive phenomenological commitment which is oriented to a conjunctural ideal. The Mattachine Society of Washington indicates that its formal purpose is to

. . . act by any lawful means: (a) To secure for homosexuals the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as proclaimed for all men by the Declaration of Independence, and to secure for homosexuals the basic rights and liberties established by the word and the spirit of the Constitution of the United States (Washington Mattachine: no date).

The Capitol District Gay Community Center also presents an instance of an intensive phenomenological commitment through commissive language.

Please take the time now to personally thank Tom Brown and Fred Field for their support [Gay Civil Rights Bill for New York State--defeated]. . . It is most important that we recognize and thank those who support us--you should do so if you live in the area (Gay Report, May, 1976: 1-2).

Through promulgating a positive topical relevance toward the individual and the creation of a categorically deviant community, the intensive-positive cell is differentiated from other cells within the conjunctural-liberal ideal type. An emphasis on the changing of legal definitions, however, links this cell to other cells within the referent.

The active-neutral cell of the conjunctural-liberal referent type denotes a neutral topical relevance in relation to the individual and the community. However, the "possibility" of developing a life-style around the homosexual phenomena is posited. The Homosexual Effort for Legal Protection (H. E. L. P. ) exemplifies this orientation.

Homophiles are in fact a behavioral minority without a common ethos. Certain members of this population have, however, been able to establish a singular and viable lifestyle on a largely individual basis (H. E. L. P. , July, 1975: 7).

This cell is also exemplified by an active phenomenological commitment to social change and is oriented toward social as well as political change.

We must work to dispel the stereotype of the pathetic, poodle-toting old queen, or the effete "Boys in the Band" syndrome. No longer can we or shall we apologize for living (H. E. L. P. , Sept., 1975: 3).

We have to ask ourselves: what can we as an organization contribute towards improving the Quality of Lifestyles [patterns of social behavior] within the TOTAL "Gay Community." First, every member of a homophile lifestyle can work to improve his/her awareness of political environments, politicians, and would-be politicians, being particularly careful not to support the well-packaged glib campaigners who are quick to forget them upon election. . . Right now I know of five major Gay organizations which are concerned with the advancement of Gay Rights. All of these organizations are doing a fine job, but they are duplicating each other in many aspects. . . I propose that we organize into one coordinating group. There is no need to form another organization for this purpose, because it already exists. I am talking about the Gay Rights Panel of the American Civil Liberties Union (H. E. L. P., Sept., 1975: 2).

H. E. L. P.'s emphasis on the formation of a coalition of we-unions to work toward the attainment of full civil-rights for gays demonstrates a specification which limits the coordination to "organizations which are concerned with the advancement of Gay Rights." Thus, the possibility of identification with other types of "deviants" becomes evident through an instrumental organization acting as a mediating agent-- in this case the A. C. L. U.

#### Conjunctural-Liberal

The types within the conjunctural-liberal referent are differentiated through the promulgation of varying topical relevances and phenomenological commitments. However, the ideals (interpretative relevances) of these types (full civil rights for homosexuals) places them within the same referent category.

#### Conjunctural-Conservative

The conjunctural-conservative referent is an exclusive referent. The relevances put forth by we-unions of this type are classified within the same categories.



Such associations are characterized by a positive topical relevance regarding the individual and the "community." The following statements by the Mattachine Society of New York and the West Side Discussion Group may serve as examples of this orientation.

Today many therapists are realizing that homosexuality is a viable life-style and that trying to change someone on such a basic dimension as sexual orientation is unnecessary and actually dangerous (Mattachine New Times, October, 1975: 5).

Each gay woman and man has to be self-made. . . Gays are presumed to be superior [in intellectual and artistic pursuits]; but their superiority, therefore, is caused by and "relative to" the cultural patterns around them (The West Sider, December, 1976: 6).

Thus, the relationship between the individual and the life-style of homosexuality which actually comprises the "community" is presented in a positive manner.

The conjunctural-conservative referent type, however, does not contain within its presentation the "possibility" of a collective effort by the association for changing specific aspects of the social structure (legal impositions). The phenomenological commitment is therefore considered consentive in nature. As the West Side Discussion Group indicates:

Our organization is non-political and does not take any stands on any issues (Personal Communication, February, 1976).

Associations of this type emphasize the social-psychological implications of "oppression" and attempt to deal with individualistic problems through an organizational effort. While they are expressive associations, they cannot be categorized as "purely" expressive associations since they represent organized efforts to deal with oppression. For example, the Mattachine Society of New York cooperates with the local police department to solve crimes against gays through its "Community Action Now" program. This is a collective effort employing instrumental action to help

resolve individualistic problems. Associations of this referent type (conjunctural-conservative) do subscribe to the ideal of legal reform but they do not make a political commitment to this effort on a collective level.

#### Reified-Conservative

This referent is constituted by two distinct modal differentiations. These two modalities (consentive-negative and consentive-positive) are identified with a reified Marxian nature and a conservative posture vis-a-vis social change. The differentiation of these two modalities may be identified through an examination of the type of reification presented within their respective ideological manifestations. The reifications of these associations are generally identifiable through their orientation toward the "community."

The consentive-negative cell of the reified conservative referent type is characterized by a negative topical relevance which presents the homosexual identity as an undesirable phenomena.

If homosexual persons have to create a "gay consciousness" that rivals a "heterosexual consciousness" in order to assert their sexual rights then nothing is gained. The result is a sexist society. The most compelling argument in favor of homosexual acts and relationships (outside of the pleasure of their performance) is that they have never become the foundation for a culture of community or style of life (Homosexual Information Center, Newsletter, #21: no date).

They [persons performing homosexual acts] want hostile laws changed, but they resent the attempt to organize their lives around homosexuality just as much as they resent the centuries-old attempt to organize their lives around heterosexuality (Homosexual Information Center, Newsletter #21: no date).

It is apparent that in relation to the referent ideal-type the reified-conservative type of association does not posit the possibility of a categorical we-union's

participation in an "authentic" mode of being. This negative topical relevance was identified as a reifying agent which tends to abstract the individual from intersubjective existence. The negative topical relevance does not allow for the existence of externally conveyed meanings supporting social action through acts identified with a specific categorical type.

By neglecting the intersubjective realm of social existence, association's identified as consensive-negative confuse objectification with alienation. The result is the kind of reifying tendency specified by O'Neill.

Alienation is a phenomenon which arises when men are estranged from the product of their mental, physical, and social activity with the result that they fail to realize an ideal of authentic being (1972: 76).

The consensive-negative modality does not allow for the existence of meaning structures with their possible political effect as a social force. Thus, it cannot incorporate a recognition of its Marxian nature, or political community, through individualistic abstraction (see Megill, 1970).

On the other hand, the consensive-positive cell of the reified-conservative referent is characterized by a positive topical relevance toward the individual's relation with the categorical community. This topical relevance, however, reified the "positive" relation of the individual to the deviant community. As the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches indicates:

It is no better to be gay than to be straight. It is no better to be straight than to be gay, but for the gay person it is best to be gay. That means that there is every reason in the world for a gay boy or girl or man or woman to rejoice in being what he or she is, not ashamed of it. . . but gladly, and with delight, accepting the drive, thanking God for it and resolving to be and act as what one is (In Unity, October, 1975: 18).

Thus, the homosexual phenomenon is viewed as being spiritually rather than humanly created. The individual homosexual is "atomized" from the community of categorical deviants through a metaphysical identification of self. Dignity, a homosexual association, supports such a reification of identity as demonstrated in the following statement.

We believe that gay Catholics are members of Christ's mystical body, numbered among the people of God (Personal Communication: April, 1976).

The phenomenological commitment for the consensive-positive orientation within the reified-conservative referent is identified as consensive. The Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches expresses this commissive language by indicating that

. . . as crusader or communicator, In Unity [the association's publication] will champion God's people's right to avoid even subtle witch burnings. In Unity should not be a political publication, nor should it advance personal ambitions of any person or group (In Unity: October, 1975: 9).

Consensive-positive modalities reify the homosexual phenomena as a pre-constitutive type which may be identified with a metaphysical phenomena. Thus, the intersubjective and historical nature of a specific phenomenon (homosexual acts) are subordinated to identification with a spiritual category.

#### Reified-Conjunctural

The instances of reification which are identified within this referent represent distinct phenomena which can be related to a Marxian sociology of knowledge through immanent meanings within a historical context. Consensive-negative modalities identify the objectification of the individual with a categorical type (homosexuality)

as an infringement on an "authentic" existence. This authenticity is presumed to be lost through social objectification. Consentive-positive modalities, on the other hand, view social objectification through homosexuality as a reflection of a higher order.

Dignity, for instance, lends support for this orientation.

We are all aware that many different settings, situations, people or places act as vehicles through which the Spirit moves within our Church. Today, I believe, that Spirit is manifesting itself through a unique group of people, speaking about injustices, both social and religious, that surround them (Dignity: January, 1976: 7).

Neither of the two modalities is concerned with the intersubjective meanings which are promulgated historically through homosexuality's everyday existence. Everyday existence depends upon a set of practice-activities within which man creates the social world through communication and action. The meanings upon which man may act are not consistent with a "human" ontology, but instead have epiphenomenal characteristics which may be identified as a reification. Thus, the essence of homosexuality in the consentive-negative type may be identified by its failure to produce a historical society. Alternatively, the essence of homosexuality in the consentive-positive type lies in the movement of spirit.

#### Other Referents

Within the typology presented in Table 1 there are four referent ideal-types which were identifiable for which no frequencies were found among the sampled associations. Following is a brief explanation for these empty cells.

#### Reified-Radical

The reified-radical referent was not found among the sampled associations. The radical modality within the conjunctural-radical/organic-radical referents was



identified with an active phenomenological commitment to social change and a positive topical relevance. From this evidence, it follows that a reified-radical referent does not retain an active phenomenological commitment. The active commitment necessitates an intersubjective identification of action orienting objectives. The reifying qualities identified in the reified-conservative referent, however, negated the intersubjective essence of its action by means of an epiphenomenal essence.

#### Reified-Liberal

An explanation for the absence of a reified-liberal referent specifically hinges upon the phenomenological commitment. The commitment to social change specified within the liberal modality is accompanied with guides for social action on a conjunctural level.

A reified-liberal referent may not be expected to have empirical manifestations. This is due to (1) the necessity of objectification of social action within the liberal modality, and (2) the emphasis upon the "human" effect on political phenomena. Thus, the political and intersubjective nature of the community serves as the essential component of this referent type.

With both the reified-radical and reified-conservative referents, the possibility of their empirical manifestation depends upon the ability to identify a Marxian identity. Such a process of identification must emphasize the intersubjective nature of the community and must identify the prerequisites for a processural orientation to the problem of social change.

### Organic-Liberal/Organic-Conservative

The absence of the organic-liberal and organic-conservative referents may be explained through the distinction drawn by Gramsci (1972) concerning conjunctural and organic subaltern groups. Within its categorical identification the organic association must retain the assumption of the possibility of social change beneficial to a "social bloc" constituted of all oppressed people. The instances identified within the liberal and the conservative modalities do not identify to a "humanly" totalized form or ideal-type. Instead, the possibilities of social action are limited to the transformation of "fetichized morality" through the changing of rational-legal rules.

### Summary

The preceding discussion has focused on the categorical qualities of homosexuality through an explication of the ideological substructure which voluntary associations promulgate through their literature. The conceptual goal of the typology presented in Table 1 is fundamentally heuristic in nature. The typology relates Marxist ideology with its identifiable modes of consciousness to other ideological positions through phenomenological analysis. The analysis focuses on the internal structure of the specific ideological modalities. The internal structure is identified through systems of phenomenological relevances as they address the possibilities of legitimate social praxis. The theoretical task for a Marxian sociology of knowledge becomes apparent through this clarification of the relationship of social praxis to a categorical identity. This "task" involves a specification of the scope of immanent meanings within categorical types and the relationship of these meanings to the future possibilities of collective action. Birnbaum argues for the necessity of this type of theoretical endeavor.

It follows from the idea of Praxis. . . that the moral and political implications of an assertion as to the organization of society and its movement be examined, that the possible consequences of a given historical situation be explored in their relevance for future direction of human activity (1971: 126).

Thus, the referent typology presented and discussed in this chapter attempts to heuristically specify modal representations of consciousness within categorical types. These representations of consciousness in turn indicate the possibilities and direction for future human activity within the collective we-union. The limits of "legitimate" human activity within each specified orientation to social praxis is inherent in the Marxian nature of the association.

The "reified" referent totalizes the essence of human activity within an epiphenomenon (the abstract individual or the abstract spiritual collective). Conjunctural referents, on the other hand, totalize the essential nature of their specific orientation toward social praxis within a particularized categorical type. This categorical type becomes self-evident through the association of identifying individuals. Organic referents, however, specify the possibility of a "totalized" human form (proletariat) existing within oppressive relations and couched in a specific historical totality (capitalism).

The heuristic qualities of this research remain its major contribution to the field. The theoretical implications of such an analysis as well as suggestions for epistemological refinement are addressed in the concluding chapter.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The substructural typology presented in the preceding chapter raises several methodological and theoretical issues which are discussed below. The presentation of the typology serves as an explanation for the possibility of a qualitative dereification within a specific structural phenomena. Such an explanation is a product of common-sense-understanding of stigma--a specific existential condition--as it is symbolically conveyed through an intersubjective identification with a conceptually legitimized type of we-phenomenon. However, legitimations are presented through the "conceptual manipulations they make possible" (Miller, 1972: 127) and therefore depend on continuous processes of social interaction with the we of co-presence (see Spiegelberg: 1973). Thus, typificatory structures are made manifest in the symbolic reality of a sub-universe of meaning within which members of voluntary associations engage in intentional activities.

In the preceding presentation the substructural categories were identified through the socio-linguistic presentation-of-self promulgated by homosexual we-unions. These collective-presentations-of-self were interpreted through a form of a Marxian sociology of knowledge as essentially outlined by Antonio Gramsci. These presentations, then, are essentially products of organic intellectuals who intersubjectively relate to a categorically identified form of deviance.

The phenomenological commitment to social change promulgated through particular weltanschauungen herein has been identified as a characteristic element of the relevance systems of particular forms of "human" consciousness. These relevance systems have been shown to be symbolic recognitions of legitimation for specific forms of collective action. Thus, the investigator is able to identify typifiable structures within a taken-for-granted reality of categorical deviance.

Sacks (1972), writing from an ethnomethodological position, presents typificational structure as the product of the interaction of two characteristic phenomena. To Sacks, the first element of typificatory structure consists of the "consistency rule" which suggests that the relation between two variables or perceived social types is mediated and "placed" through an informational item or category. Categorical phenomena, then, may become the object of a taken-for-granted nature or topical relevance. Sacks' second conceptual rule, the "economy rule," delimits the scope of inquiry into the processural elements of typificational structures. This form of typified meaning structure serves to confer practical or interpretative relevance upon one interpretational device to the exclusion of other explanatory mechanisms (1972: 31-34).

These rules of typification have been employed in this thesis in the form of the topical and the interpretative relevances. The implementation of these relevance structures has enabled the investigator to specify the possibilities of collective action for particular sub-structural ideal-types with their accompanying essential identities. The specification of interpretative relevances as they relate to a phenomenological commitment to the attainment of these ideals has been utilized to differentiate the Marxian nature of specific ideal-typical referents within the sampled voluntary associations of homosexuals.



### Theoretical Implications

Constituting a phenomenological exegesis of a reflexive sociology of knowledge within a Marxian paradigm, this thesis has emphasized the categorical elements of the ontological realities of specific voluntary associations of deviants. Clearly, the most important theoretical implication of this thesis lies in the conceptual synthesis of the labeling/symbolic interactionist and phenomenological orientations in the study of deviance. This synthesized orientation serves as the basis for the analysis of the formation of symbolic displays of unity for a categorically deviant type. This theoretical stance allows for the possibility of a reflexive form of a Marxian sociology of knowledge oriented to the transformation of existing institutional relationships through a phenomenological portrayal of ideological meanings.

The conceptual synthesis of the labeling and phenomenological perspectives in the study of social deviance allows the researcher to emphasize the intersubjective base of identity and the rhetorical possibilities of self-transformation within a particular type. This emphasis on the qualitative realm of social praxis presupposes a Marxian sociology of knowledge which is not limited to an "objectivist" dichotomy between Marxist knowledge and bourgeois ideology (see Piccone, 1973; Birnbaum, 1971). Instead, in this thesis orientations to social praxis are presented as they relate to the possibilities for social change promulgated through the relevance structures of a collective presentation-of-self on the reified, conjunctural, and organic levels.

This theoretical explication of Marxian sociology of knowledge within the study of social deviance allows for a conceptual redefinition of class. Such a redefinition acknowledges the contradictions within a type of Marxism which identifies

the proletariat as an objective entity, instead of an intentionally created phenomenon (see Gouldner, 1973). Blum specifically describes the absence of a reflexive orientation within the "orthodox" (objectivist) Marxist paradigm as

. . . an invisible separation which is erected between Marx's speech and that about which he speaks. . . there is no notion of the unified character of the praxis of language, or of the way in which so-called "object statements" are only given life within an interpretative context of interests (1973: 25).

From a phenomenological orientation to Marxism, Piccone indicates that a new, critical Marxism adequate to today's realities must start out by reconstituting first and foremost the notion of class (1971: 23).

Following from this theoretical disarray within the Marxian paradigm, some proponents of the ethnomethodological orientation to social reality have advocated the notion of "class. . . as something persons do with their speaking practices" (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 218). However, other ethnomethodologists have indicated that the proletariat is made up of everyone who produces alienated speech (see Filmer, et. al., 1973). These advocates of the ethnomethodological practice of Marxism argue that they

. . . do research and write papers together, but not in an effort to describe the world. Instead their work represents a "commitment to another community. A community bought (read) and sold (written) for instrumental purposes. . . for the mode of existence which is enslaved by what it seeks to enslave" (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 222).

This orientation to the practice of Marxism does not retain a reflexive stance vis-a-vis social reality and the intersubjective dimensions of symbolic identification. These ethnomethodologists deny the "instrumentality" of the "de-stratifying" practices of their "community," yet as Mehan and Wood have indicated:

The purpose of this community is to tutor one another in the experience that all praxis is sensuous human activity. Reading and writing are not to be excluded from this conception (1975: 223).

The community with which the ethnomethodological school identifies represents a hegemonic force since "theirs is a method by which they hope to experience Marx's reflexive truths" (Mehan and Wood, 1975: 223). Within this general context Wolff indicates that both "philosophical radicals" and "political radicals" must suspend preconceived notions of class. Wolff, however, argues that

awareness of this task. . . calls for [the recognition by philosophical radicals of]. . . the moral inescapability of political responsibility. It calls for persuading political radicals. . . to recognize human beings and to understand and treat them as ends (1973: 55).

Such a recognition is basic to the Husserlian notion of the intersubjective nature of subjectivity (see Piccone, 1973). It is of no small significance to that Marxian sociology of knowledge which is oriented toward the possibility of intersubjective totalization of particularistic problems. The possibilities for this totalization of homosexual substructure have been addressed in the preceding chapters through particularistic (conjunctural) or universalized (organic) ideals. However, within each of the associations sampled the presentation of an intersubjective nature was considered a necessary condition for its placement within a processural type.

The promulgation of particularistic or universalized ideals by an association represents an orientation to structural reform which "is implemented by the people who demand it" (Marzotto, et. al., 1975: 44). Piccone, however, expresses hesitation with regard to the efficacy of structural investigations due to the absorption of alienation into mediating categories. He indicates that the practical effect of the criticism entailed in structural analysis is that "it freezes the fluid reality of groups into fixed stereotypes" (1971: 30). As it relates to the research embodied in this thesis,

Piccone's criticism is certainly viable. The explication of a structural presentation, however, may be enhanced through a more systematic methodological orientation; and the importance of the present endeavor lies in the direction or heuristic guidance it may provide for such an approach.

### Methodological Implications

Heretofore analyses of various forms of voluntary associations have avoided the type of phenomenological analysis of substructure attempted in this thesis. The method here employed transcends earlier efforts in the sense that it allows for the differentiation of levels of commitment to the legitimation of a negative, collective identity. Sagarin's Odd Man In (1969), perhaps the major contribution to the field, relies heavily upon a simplistic dichotomization of associational types which views such groups as being either instrumental or expressive. He fails to recognize that the critical, phenomenological significance of associational organization lies in the fact that the action associated with organizational efforts is both symbolic and instrumental. The analytical distinction of a purely expressive or purely instrumental association is simply not possible. The very action of symbolic identification is instrumental in that it facilitates the continuation of a categorical identity with a concomitant hegemony of meaning. The method of analysis employed in this thesis--a phenomenologically-based differentiation of the various levels of categorical substructure--is essentially a heuristic framework designed to facilitate micro-investigations of the intersubjective construction of the realities accompanying these categories.

### The Ethnomethodological Contribution

The potential contribution of ethnomethodology to the phenomenological approach of this thesis is best put in the pragmatic dictum that "we would not wish to do other than focus only on that part [of man's behavior] which is overt" (Coulter, 1971: 307). This requirement precludes the ability of ethnomethodological endeavors, which look for decontextualized coding-rules for human experience and decontextualized rules of inference to contribute to a phenomenological analysis of categorical substructure. The attempt to experience reflexive truths through reading and writing within a "community" of ethnomethodologists is "as positivistic in intent as the forging of Humean causal or probabalistic laws of social life" (Coulter, 1971: 311).

The ethnomethodological emphasis on the "openness" of the social world, however, is complementary to the phenomenological assumption that ideologies order collective-interests through the promulgation of relevance systems. The ethnomethodological conception of "family resemblance" among various courses of social action enables the investigator to break away from the essentialist position that presupposes universally common features.

Conversely, the phenomenological conception of the possibilities of social praxis within an ideological position does not render the individual member a "judgmental dope" (see Garfinkel, 1956). Members of categorical we-unions, as ideological participants, may interpersonally negotiate their experiences into public "we-talk" and through this action of negotiation may invoke the et cetera clause in ideological situations.

This interpersonal negotiation is most profound within ideological primary groups. Thus, an ethnomethodological investigation into the construction of we-talk



within ideological primary groups is important for a phenomenological analysis of ideology which is couched within a Marxian sociology of knowledge. An approach of this nature must attempt a mapping of ideological substructure within a categorical type of deviance based upon intersubjective processes of reality construction. Such an attempt is beyond the scope of this thesis. A mapping of categorical substructure would entail an analysis of the possibilities of convergence among various ideal-typical referents. Thus, the possibilities of legitimate social praxis must be viewed as intersubjectively based meanings. They represent heuristic conceptions instead of reified sedimentations.

#### Summary

This thesis has attempted to relate phenomenological relevances, specified through voluntary associations of deviants, to thematic possibilities of legitimate social praxis. Utilizing a Marxian sociology of knowledge, this work specifies the substructural components of categorical identification. These components in turn may serve as heuristic guides to further research in the area of the negotiated aspects of collective self-presentation through phenomenological we-talk. By necessity such research would employ a view of ideology which focuses on a negotiated construction of reality through ideological primary groups rather than one which conceptually depicts ideology as a consensual epiphenomena.

This approach to ideology should enable scholars to implement ethnomethodology in the study of the interpretative features of political organization. This in turn will allow for a Marxian sociology which avoids the objectivistic notion of false consciousness in an assessment of a political agency. Indeed, the organization of labor as praxis may be viewed as projected moments symbolizing the possibility of emancipation.

APPENDIX A

INITIAL SAMPLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS  
OF HOMOSEXUALS

Council on Religion and the Homosexual

83 McAllister Street  
Room 421  
San Francisco, California  
94102

Dignity

755 Boylston Street  
Room 514  
Boston, Massachusetts  
02116

Gay Academic Union

Box 1479  
Hunter College, C. U. N. Y.  
695 Park Avenue  
New York, New York  
10021

Gay Activists Alliance

Post Office Box 2  
Village Station  
New York, New York  
10014

Homophile Effort For Legal Protection

Post Office Box 3416  
Hollywood, California  
90028

Mattachine Society of New York

59 Christopher Street  
New York, New York  
10014

## APPENDIX B

### LETTER OF CONTACT WITH SAMPLED ASSOCIATIONS

Dear \_\_\_\_\_:

I am a graduate student at Western Kentucky University in sociology and presently I am working toward the completion of my thesis. My thesis' central concern is focused on voluntary associations and their relation to social change. I was referred to your organization by a member of \_\_\_\_\_, who informed me that you might be of aid to me. I am sending this letter as a request for any pamphlets or newsletters which your group might have available concerning your orientation to homosexuality and the relation of the homosexual to society. I realize that the number of pamphlets or newsletters that you have may be limited; however, I would greatly appreciate it if you could send your latest pamphlets available with as many of your previous pamphlets or newsletters as possible.

Also, in order to facilitate a more representative sample and lend more validity to my thesis, I would like to request that you provide me with a list of from five to ten organizations which you consider to be of prominence and importance to the movement for homosexual rights. I am not requesting this list of organizations to imply that some groups are more important than others; however, I cannot feasibly hope to gain materials from all the associations representing homosexuality and must limit my scope of inquiry.

Your aid in securing these materials and information will be invaluable to me as a student and as a person interested in the relation of the homosexual to society. Your immediate attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated since as a graduate student I am pressed for time and money. Also, I am enclosing \$1.00 to cover mailing expenses. I assure you that I will send the extra money if this is not sufficient.

Sincerely,

Larry R. Irons

## APPENDIX C

### TOTAL SAMPLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS SURVEYED

Capitol District Gay Community Center	Box 131 Albany, New York 12201
Chicago Gay Crusader	Post Office Box 872 Chicago, Illinois 60690
Christopher Street West Association	Post Office Box 3949 Hollywood, California 90028
Church of the Beloved Disciple	348 West 14th Street New York, New York 10014
Council on Religion and the Homosexual	83 Sixth Street San Francisco, California 94103
Dignity	755 Boylston Street Room 514 Boston, Massachusetts 02116
Gay Academic Union	Box 480, Lennox Hill Station New York, New York 10021
Gay Activists Alliance	Post Office Box 2 Village Station New York, New York 10014
Gay Caucus: Youth Against War and Fascism	46 West 21st Street New York, New York 10010
Gay Community Services Center	1213 N. Highland Avenue Post Office Box 38777 Hollywood, California 90038
Gay People at Columbia Barnard	304 Earl Hall Columbia University New York, New York 10027

APPENDIX C  
(continued)

Gay Rights Committee: American Civil  
Liberties Union of Southern California

Homophile Effort for Legal Protection

Homosexual Information Center

Institute of Social Ethics

Lavender & Red Union

Mattachine Society of New York

Mattachine Society of the Niagra Frontier

The Mattachine Society of Washington

National Gay Task Force

The Society of Pat Rocco Enlightened Enthusiasts

The Society for Individual Rights

Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan  
Community Churches

West Side Discussion Group

633 S. Shatto Place  
Los Angeles, California 90005

Post Office Box 3416  
Hollywood, California 90028

3473 1/2 Cahuaga Boulevard  
Hollywood, California 90068

Bushnell Plaza 22 Bc  
One Gold Street  
Hartford, Connecticut 06103

6844 Sunset Boulevard  
Los Angeles, California 90028

59 Christopher Street  
New York, New York 10014

Post Office Box 975  
Ellicott Square Station  
Buffalo, New York 14205

Post Office Box 1032  
Washington, D. C. 20013

80 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York 10011

83 Sixth Street  
San Francisco, California 94103

83 Sixth Street  
San Francisco, California 94103

Post Office Box 36277  
Los Angeles, California 90036

Box 611, Old Chelsea Station  
New York, New York 10011



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